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ABSTRACT
The present research investigated fac ia l-affect  recognition by 
people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Experiment one piloted a 
facial-affect recognition task of the six basic emotions with 58 
undergraduate university students (36 female, 22 male). No sex 
d ifferences  were found in perform ance  of the facial-affect  
recognition task. Experiment two compared accuracy on the facial- 
affect  recognition task for 19 paranoid  sch izophren ics ,  14 
nonparanoid schizophrenics, 16 depressives (clinical controls),  and 
20 normal controls. As predicted, positive emotions were found to 
be more accurately recognised than negat ive emotions.  The 
hypothesis that nonparanoid schizophrenics would be less accurate 
than paranoid schizophrenics on the facial-affect recognition task 
was not supported. The hypothesis that depressed participants 
would be less accurate than normal on the facial-affect recognition 
task was also not supported. The hypothesis that schizophrenics 
would perform less accurately than the control groups on the facial- 
affect recognition task was supported by the current results. The 
hypothesis that the differences among the four groups on the six 
emotion labelling tasks could be explained simply by the relative 
difficulties of those tasks was also supported. The current research 
did not find a differential deficit for negative-affect recognition in 
schizophrenia. It was argued that differential deficits for negative- 
affect recognition found by previous research were artefacts of 
item difficulty. The current  research also argued against a 
different ial  schizophrenic  deficit  for fac ia l -af fec t  recognition. 
Deficits in facial-affect recognition appear to be a function of 
generalised poor performance in visual attention and perception. 
Im plica t ions  for theory, t rea tment  and future  research are 
d iscussed.
1Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Facial-affect  recognition is an important interpersonal  skill for 
social interaction (Ekman, 1992). People often interpret  how 
another person is feeling from that person's facial expression 
(Izard, 1992).
Schizophrenia is often associated with poor interpersonal skills and 
a deterioration of social relationships (Rosenhan & Seligman, 1989). 
This social decline may be due, in part, to difficulty recognising 
facial-affect (Feinberg, Rifkin, Shaeffer, & Walker, 1986; Morrison, 
Bellack, & Mueser, 1988).
The facial-affect  recognition literature has consistently reported 
that clinical groups, such as schizophrenics  and depressives, 
perform less accurately than normal controls on tasks of facial- 
affect recognition (Feinberg, et al, 1986; Gessler, Cutting, Frith, & 
Weinman, 1989; Morrison, et al, 1988; Walker, McGuire, & Bettes, 
1984). Furthermore ,  sch izophren ics  general ly  pe rform less 
accurately  than depress ives on fac ia l-affect  recognit ion tasks 
(Feinberg, et al, 1986; Persad & Polivy, 1993; Gur, Erwin, Gur, Zwil, 
Heimberg, & Kraemer, 1992; Rubinow & Post, 1992).
The present research investigated the ability to recognise facial- 
affect by people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Before the 
facial-affect literature is reviewed in detail (section 1.2, page 10), 
the general features of schizophrenia are summarised to provide an 
initial understanding of the schizophrenic condition (section 1.1).
21 .1  GENERAL FEATURES OF SCHIZOPHRENIA
1.1.1 Diagnostic Criteria for Schizophrenia
T he D iagnostic  and S ta tis tica l M anual o f M ental D iso rders  (D SM -IV ,
A m e ric a n  P sy c h ia tr ic  A sso c ia tio n , 1 9 9 4 ) d ia g n o s t ic  c r i te r ia  fo r
sch izo p h ren ia  are p resen ted  in T ab le  1.
T ab le  1 The D SM -IV  D iagnostic  C riteria  fo r S ch izophren ia .
A. Characteristic Symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for a 
significant portion of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully 
treated):
(1) delusions
(2) hallucinations
(3) disorganised speech (eg., frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour
(5) negative symptoms, ie., affective flattening, alogia or avolition
Note: Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or hallucinations 
consist of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the person's behaviour or 
thoughts, or two or more voices conversing with each other.
B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of time since the onset 
of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as work, 
interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to 
the onset (or when the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve 
expected level of interpersonal, academic, or occupational achievement).
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6 months. This 
six-month period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if 
successfully treated) that meet Criterion A (ie., active-phase symptoms) and may 
include periods of prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal or 
residual periods, the signs of the disturbance may be manifested by only negative 
symptoms or two or more symptoms listed in Criterion A present in an attenuated 
form (eg., odd beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences).
Table 1 The DSM-IV D iaenostic  C rite ria  fo r S ch izophren in  
(C ontinued)
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D. Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective Disorder and 
Mood Disorder With Psychotic Features have been ruled out because either (1) no 
Major Depressive, Manic, or Mixed Episodes have occurred concurrently with the 
active-phase symptoms; or (2) if mood episodes have occurred during active- 
phase symptoms, their total duration has been brief relative to the duration of the 
active and residual periods.
E. Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the 
direct physiological effects of a substance (eg., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a 
general medical condition.
F. Relationship to a Pervasive Developmental Disorder: If there is a history of 
Autistic Disorder or another Pervasive Developmental Disorder, the additional 
diagnosis of Schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations 
are also present for at least a month (or less if successfully treated).
(From the American Psychiatric Association, 1994, pp 285-286)
1 . 1 . 2  Incidence and Prevalence  of Schizophrenia
P revalence  estim ates for sch izophren ia  vary as a resu lt of 
d ifferences in defin itions of sch izophren ia  (eg narrow  versus 
broad), and in the location of sam ples (eg rural versus urban). 
DSM -IV reported that lifetim e prevalence rates of schizophrenia 
are usually estim ated to be betw een 0.5% and 1% (A m erican 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).
In c id e n ce  ra tes  are low er than  p rev a len c e  ra te s , since
schizophrenia tends to be a relatively chronic condition. DSM-IV 
reported that incidence rates were estim ated to be 1 per 10 000 
per year (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
However, the incidence and prevalence of schizophrenia appears to 
differ among socioeconomic levels. The incidence of schizophrenia 
in poor socioeconom ic classes is three times greater than the 
incidence in w ealthy socioeconom ic c lasses. Furtherm ore, the
4prevalence of schizophrenia is eight times greater in the poor than 
in the wealthy (Rosenhan & Seligman, 1989).
The first episode of schizophrenia generally occurs in people who 
are under 45 years-of-age. There are sex differences in the 
average age of onset for schizophrenia. Males are more at risk for 
schizophrenia before age 25, whereas females are more at risk 
after age 25 (Rosenhan & Seligman, 1989).
1 . 1 . 3  Classif ication of the Schizophrenias
Many different symptomatologies come under the diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia. Researchers have attempted to simplify these 
symptomatologies into a classification system since the nineteenth 
century. Disagreement remains about which system best classifies 
the schizophrenias. Two classification systems for schizophrenia 
commonly used in the literature are reviewed in sections 1.1.3.1 
and 1.1.3.2. The first system is the class ic subtypes of 
schizophrenia (1.1.3.1, page 4), followed by the distinction between 
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia (1.1.3.2, page 7).
The paranoid/nonparanoid distinction is favoured by the present 
research,  due to its reduction of the symptomatology overlap 
evident between the classic subtypes. The paranoid/nonparanoid 
distinction is relevant to the present research because of reported 
differences between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia on 
facial-affect recognition. Paranoid schizophrenics have performed 
more accurately on facial-affect recognition tasks than nonparanoid 
schizophrenics (Kline, Smith, & Ellis, 1992; Lewis & Garver, 1995).
1 . 1 . 3 . 1  The Classic Subtypes  of  Schizophrenia
The classification system used in DSM-IV lists five subtypes of 
schizophrenia: Paranoid, Disorganised, Catatonic, Undifferentiated, 
and Residual. Table 2 presents the diagnostic criteria for the 
subtypes. These classic subtypes of schizophrenia closely resemble 
those identified by Kraepelin (1913) and Bleuler (1911) (both cited 
in Nicholson & Nuefeld, 1993).
T able  2 The D SM -IV  Subtypes o f S ch izo p h ren ia  and th e ir  D iagnostic  
C rite ria .
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1. Paranoid Type
A Type of Schizophrenia in which the following criteria are met:
A. Preoccupation with one or more delusions or frequent auditory hallucinations.
B. None of the following is prominent: disorganised speech, disorganised or 
catatonic behaviour, or flat or inappropriate affect
2. Disorganised Type
A Type of Schizophrenia in which the following criteria are met:
A. All of the following are prominent:
(1) disorganised speech
(2) disorganised behaviour
(3) flat or inappropriate affect
B . The criteria are not met for Catatonic Type.
3. Catatonic Type
A Type of Schizophrenia in which the clinical picture is dominated by at least two of the 
following:
(1) motoric immobility as evidenced by catalepsy (including waxy flexibility) or 
stupor
(2) excessive motor activity (that is apparently purposeless and not influenced by 
external stimuli)
(3) extreme negativism (an apparently motiveless resistance to all instructions or 
maintenance or a rigid posture against attempts to be moved) or mutism
(4) peculiarities of voluntary movement as evidenced by posturing (voluntary 
assumption of inappropriate or bizarre postures), stereotyped movements, 
prominent mannerisms, or prominent grimacing
(5) echolalia or echopraxia
T able 2 The D SM -IV  Subtypes o f S ch izop h ren ia  and their D iagn ostic  
C riteria (C ontinu ed )
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4. Undifferentiated Type
A Type of Schizophrenia in which symptoms that meet Criterion A are present, but the 
criteria are not met for the Paranoid, Disorganised, or Catatonic Type.
5. Residual Type
A Type of Schizophrenia in which the following criteria are met:
A. Absence of prominent delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech, and grossly 
disorganised or catatonic behaviour.
B . There is continuing evidence of the disturbance, as indicated by the presence of 
negative symptoms or two or more symptoms listed in Criterion A for 
Schizophrenia, present in an attenuated form (eg., odd beliefs, unusual perceptual 
experiences).
(From the American Psychiatric Association, 1994, pp 287-290)
Concerns exist regarding the utility of the DSM-IV subtypes in 
clinical practice (Andreasen, 1987; Nicholson & Neufeld, 1993; 
Tsuang & Winokur, 1974). Individuals with schizophrenia often
present symptomatologies that overlap with two or more of the 
classic subtypes (Tsuang & Winokur, 1974). The definitions in 
DSM-IV have forced these individuals to be diagnosed under one 
su b ty p e .
For example suppose an individual presents with disorganised 
speech, flat affect (symptoms associated with disorganised subtype) 
and bizarre posturing (a symptom associated with catatonic 
subtype). According to the DSM-IV criteria in Table 2, this 
individual  would be diagnosed as ca ta ton ic  subtype  since 
disorganised subtype can only be diagnosed without catatonic 
symptomatology.  Both disorganised and catatonic subtypes are 
descriptive of the individual, yet they would be classified, by 
definition, as catatonic.
7The problem of overlap in symptomatology between the classic 
subtypes was also illustrated by Morrison (1974). Morrison
reported that admission rates at a major psychiatric hospital, for 
the classic subtypes of schizophrenia, varied significantly over 
period of forty-six years. Only the diagnosis  of paranoid 
schizophren ia  remained constant  over this time. Morrison
concluded that a paranoid/nonparanoid distinction reduced the 
overlap in symptomatology of the classic subtypes.
The classic subtypes have a serious problem of overlap in 
symptomatology, especially between the disorganised and catatonic 
subtypes (Tsuang & Winokur, 1974). For this reason, the classic 
subtypes were discarded by the present research. The expected 
overlap  in sym ptom ato logy  be tween  sub types  would have 
c o m p ro m is e d  a c la s s ic - su b ty p e  d iv is io n  of  the  p resen t  
schizophrenic sample.
1 . 1 . 3 . 2  The Paranoid and Nonparanoid Subtypes  of  
S c h i z o p h r e n i a
Another means of classification for the schizophrenias involves 
dis t inguishing between paranoid and nonparanoid subtypes of 
schizophrenia. All individuals who do not fit the criteria for
paranoid schizophrenia  (refer  to Table 2) are c lassif ied as 
nonparanoid schizophrenics.
Research literature on presentation and course of schizophrenia 
suppor ts  a d is t inc t ion  between parano id  and nonparano id  
schizophrenia (Nicholson & Neufeld, 1993). The research of 
Morrison (1974, refer to section 1.1.3.1, page 7) shows a stability in 
the frequency of diagnosis for paranoid schizophrenia, and an 
instability for diagnoses of the other classic subtypes. Morrison 
supported a paranoid/nonparanoid  dist inction and viewed any 
further division of nonparanoid schizophrenia to be subject to 
either environmental influences or diagnostic fads.
The paranoid/nonparanoid classification has less overlap between 
subtypes than the classic (DSM-IV) system of class if ication 
(Nicholson & Neufeld, 1993). This lack of overlap between
8subtypes was indirect ly supported by Farmer,  McGuff in ,  & 
Spitznagel (1983). Farmer et al found two clusters, in their cluster 
analysis of schizophrenic symptoms, which partially parallel the 
paranoid/nonparanoid division (Nicholson & Neufeld, 1993). One 
factor, resembling paranoid schizophrenia,  was characterised by 
delusions, better premorbid adjustment, and a later age of onset. 
The second factor, resembling nonparanoid schizophrenia , was 
characterised by a family history of schizophrenia , incoherent 
speech, blunted affect, and auditory hallucinations. This research 
provides evidence for overlap in symptomatology, course of illness, 
and outcome measures, between individuals diagnosed with the 
four classic  subtypes subsumed under the nonparanoid  label 
(Disorganised, Catatonic, Undifferentiated, and Residual).
Evidence presented against the paranoid/nonparanoid distinction 
was that some individuals experience symptomatology that is 
neither  truly paranoid nor truly nonparanoid ,  but shows an 
undifferentiated combination of both symptomatologies (Berkowitz, 
1981; Katz, Cole, & Lowry, 1964). Similarly, Magaro, Abrams, & 
Cantrell (1981), in an investigation of the Maine Scale of Paranoid 
and Nonparanoid Schizophrenia,  concluded that  some cases of 
sch izophren ia  were unclassif iable  into d is t inc t  paranoid  and 
n onparano id  subtypes.  These  cases were ca tego r ised  as 
unclassifiable, or undifferentiated, schizophrenics.
Further evidence against the paranoid/nonparanoid distinction, is 
the reduction of paranoid symptomatology over time. As paranoid 
s c h iz o p h re n ic s  becom e ch ro n ic ,  e v id e n c e  su g g e s t s  their  
symptomatology becomes concordant with that of nonparanoid 
schizophrenics (Depue & Woodburn, 1975; Pfohl & Winokur, 1983; 
Ritzier, 1981). Cases of change from nonparanoid to paranoid 
symptomatology exist, although they are relatively rare (Tsuang, 
Wilson, Winokur, & Crowe, 1981).
By contrast,  research evidence that paranoid and nonparanoid 
schizophrenics differ on a number of important variables, supports 
the paranoid/nonparanoid distinction.  Paranoid schizophrenics 
have a later onset of illness and a better premorbid adjustment (as 
measured by a higher level of social competency and a higher 
incidence of marriage) than nonparanoids (Burack & Zigler, 1989,
9cited in Nicholson & Neufeld, 1993). Paranoid symptoms have 
reduced faster, and to a more significant degree following diagnosis, 
than nonparanoid symptoms (Goldberg, Schooler, & Mattsson, 
1967) . Fu r th e rm o re ,  there was ev idence  tha t  pa ranoid
sch izo p h ren ic s  have a be t ter  p rognos is  than nonparano id  
schizophrenics (Kendler, Gruenberg, & Tsuang, 1984; Nicholson & 
Neufeld, 1993).
Furthermore, the paranoid/nonparanoid distinction is relevant to 
the facial-affect recognition literature. Kline et al (1992) found that 
paranoid schizophrenics performed more accurately on a facial- 
affect recognition task than nonparanoid schizophrenics. They 
concluded this difference was due to a poorly organised emotional 
schema in nonparanoid schizophrenics (for more detail refer to 
section 1.2.4.4, page 26).
In an attempt to reconcile the evidence for and against  the 
paranoid/nonparanoid  dist inction, Nicholson & Neufeld (1993)
proposed a reconceptualisation of the division. Rather than viewing 
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia as discrete subtypes, they 
proposed that schizophrenia exists in a continuum of severity. 
Paranoid schizophrenia was viewed as the less severe form of the 
illness, since it was associated with a later age at onset, better
p rem orb id  sta tus ,  and a be tter  p rognos is .  N onparano id
schizophrenia was considered the more severe form of the illness, 
since it was associated with ear l ier  onset,  poorer premorbid 
adjus tment ,  and poorer  prognosis .  The indiv iduals  whose 
symptoms did not allow a clear classification into paranoid or 
nonparanoid subtypes fell in the middle range of the continuum, 
and were 'unclassifiable' or 'undifferentiated' schizophrenics.
The present research used the paranoid/nonparanoid distinction to 
classify the schizophrenic sample. The classic subtypes were 
d iscarded  by the present  research  since their  overlap  in
symptomatology (Andreasen, 1987; Nicholson & Neufeld, 1993; 
Tsuang & Winokur, 1974) would have caused redundancy in a 
classic-subtype division of the present schizophrenic sample. The 
paranoid/nonparanoid distinction substantially reduces the overlap 
in symptomatology between subtypes of schizophrenia (Nicholson 
& Neufeld, 1993).
Research has found differences between paranoid and nonparanoid 
schizophrenics on variables such as onset of illness, premorbid 
adjustment (Burack & Zigler, 1989), course of illness (Goldberg, et 
al, 1967), and prognosis (Kendler, et al, 1984; Nicholson & Neufeld, 
1993) .  T h is  r e s e a rc h  su p p o r t s  the  u t i l i t y  of  the 
paranoid/nonparanoid distinction. Of particular relevance to the 
present research is the finding of differences between paranoid and 
nonparanoid schizophrenics on tasks of emotion recognition (Kline, 
et al, 1992; Lewis & Garver, 1995). For these reasons, the present 
research classified the schizophrenic sample into paranoid and 
nonparanoid subtypes.
1 .2  FACIAL-AFFECT RECOGNITION
Facial-affect recognition refers to the identification of the emotional 
expression portrayed on a person's face. Recognition of emotional 
expression is an important component of social interaction. Ekman 
(1992) reported that people with congenita l  facial  paralysis 
(Mobius Syndrome) have difficulty developing and maintaining 
re la t io n sh ip s  due to their  lack of c ap ab i l i ty  for facial  
exp ress iveness .
Schizophrenia is also associated with poor interpersonal skills, and a 
deterioration of social relationships (Rosenhan & Seligman, 1989). 
This social decline may be due, in part, to difficulty recognising 
facial expressions of affect (Feinberg, et al, 1986; Morrison, et al, 
1988). It is important to establish a link between facial expression 
and emotion to justify the present study's use of a facial-affect 
recognition task as a measure of emotion perception. For this
reason, the current and following (1.2.1, page 12) sections review 
the literature that has investigated the relationship between facial 
expressions and emotions.
Humans, and other higher order primates, have voluntary control 
over facial muscles This allows the voluntary formation of various 
facial express ions (Izard, 1994). People often interpret  how 
another person is feeling from that person's facial expression 
(Izard, 1994). This can benefit, or hinder, the person portraying 
the emotion. For example, a child who appears sad may encourage
warmth and affection from its mother, whereas a soldier who 
shows fear may be targeted by an enemy.
The ability to alter our facial expressions voluntarily, so that they 
may be incongruent to our true feelings, is adaptive (Izard, 1994). 
People can hide facial expressions in an attempt to hide what they 
are feeling from other people. They can also show expressions of 
emotions they do not feel, in an attempt to control the behaviour of 
people around them. For example, actors use voluntary control of 
facial expressions to evoke the perception of emotion in others.
However, facial expression may not be the only, or a necessary 
system for portraying emotion. Other channels can also effectively 
portray emotive information (Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, & Scherer, 
1980). Emotion can be portrayed in the tone of voice. For example, 
fear may be evidenced by a shaky, hesitant voice. Emotion can also 
be portrayed in the position of the body, or by body movement. 
For example, anger may be expressed by tensed muscles and closed 
fists.
The interpretation of the facial express ions of others may not 
always reveal what people are feeling. The person's tone of voice 
or body position may reveal additional information that is useful 
for interpreting that individual's emotional experience. Although 
researchers have suggested that there may be distinct tones of 
voice for each emotion (Tomkins, 1962, cited in Ekman, 1992), this 
has not been empirically investigated (Ekman, 1992). In contrast, 
the interpretation of emotion by facial expression has been widely 
investigated (Camras, 1992; Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994; Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1971; Ekman, et al, 1980; Izard, 1992; Matsumoto, 1992).
The present study used the recognition of facial expression as a 
measure of emotion perception. Facial expression was chosen
above other channels of emotion perception because it has been 
more widely investigated, and has shown stronger empirical links 
with emotion, than the other channels (Ekman, 1992). Ekman 
(1992) argued that the interpretation of facial expression has 
provided the strongest evidence for distinguishing one emotion 
from another. A summary of this evidence is presented in section 
1.2.1 below.
1 . 2 . 1 The Six Basic Facial Expressions of Emotion
Extensive research supports the existence of basic emotions that are 
a universal aspect of human experience (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 
1994; Camras, 1992; Izard, 1992; Izard, 1994; Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 1992; Matsumoto, 1992). The most consistent evidence for 
universal emotions is that facial expressions have been similarly 
recognised by various cultures to reflect particular emotion states 
(Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994; Izard, 1992; Izard, 1994; Johnson- 
Laird & Oatley, 1992; Matsumoto, 1992). The six basic emotions 
generally reported are happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust, 
and fear.
Izard (1994) argued, that basic emotions are innate responses to 
internal and external stimuli. Emotions are attributed evolutionary 
significance for their communicatory role with other members of 
the species (Izard, 1994). Furthermore, Ekman (1992) postulated 
that each basic emotion is not a single affect ive state, but 
represents a family of related states. He stated that each emotion 
family shares characteristics, such as commonalities in expression, 
in physiological activity, and in the type of event that triggers 
them .
There is some controversy in the l iterature surrounding the 
existence of basic emotions. One argument against basic emotions, 
is that the research is inconsistent in its labelling of which emotions 
'basic' (Turner & Ortony, 1992). Although there is variation in
which emotions are labelled basic by different researchers, there is 
a core of consistency that supports the existence of basic emotions. 
Most researchers have five emotions in common, in their list of 
basic emotions. These emotions are happiness, sadness, anger,
disgust, and fear (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994; Johnson-Laird & 
Oatley, 1992). Variations in which emotions are considered basic 
generally comprise additions to this core group of five emotions. 
For example: Ekman (1992, 1994) added surprise, and sometimes 
contempt, to the basic five; whereas Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1992) 
added desire.
The evidence of universality in facial-affect recognition (Ekman, 
1992; Izard, 1992; Matsumoto, 1992) appears more consistent than 
evidence for the universality of the subjective experience of basic 
emotions (Ekman, 1992). Most research in the area of basic 
emotions has investigated the ex is tence  of universal  facial 
expressions of emotion (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994; Izard, 1992; 
Izard, 1994; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Matsumoto, 1992). The 
reason that facial-affect recognition has been investigated in this 
context is the inherent difficultly in operationally defining the 
subjective experience of emotion (Ekman, 1992). The two concepts 
are related, however, since many researchers agree that facial 
expressions are linked to the subjective experience of emotion 
(Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992; Whissel, 1985).
Ekman (1992) noted that there was more than one facial expression 
for each emotion. He argued that there were certain configurations 
of facial muscles that represented each emotion. For example: in 
anger, the eyebrows are converged downwards; in disgust, the nose 
is wrinkled upwards; and in happiness, the corners of the mouth 
turn up in a 'smile'.
The facial expressions of emotion commonly considered universal 
are happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise. These are 
the six emotions favoured by Ekman and colleagues (Ekman, 1992; 
Ekman, 1994; Ekman, & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, et al, 1980) who are 
dominant researchers in the area of universality of emotions. 
These six emotions are considered universal because they have 
been consistently identified across western and non-western, as 
well as literate and preliterate, cultures (Ekman, 1992).
Matsumoto (1992) found that Japanese (a non-western culture) and 
American (a western culture) samples did not differ in their 
recognition accuracy for happiness and surprise. He found that 
Americans were more accurate than Japanese in recognising anger, 
sadness, disgust, and fear. The Americans and Japanese agreed, 
however, that happiness was the easiest to identify and fear was 
the most difficult.
A possible  contamination for research with literate cultures  
(western and non-western) is that the people in those cultures may
have learned the emotional expressions from inter-cultural contact, 
or from a common source such as movies or television. It was 
argued that for an emotion to be universal it must transcend the
boundaries of language (Ekman, 1994). To remove the source of 
this contamination, emotion recognition has also been studied in 
preliterate cultures that have had minimal contact with outside
cultures .
Ekman (1994) summarised a study he conducted of emotion 
recognition with the South Fore, a preliterate culture in New Guinea. 
This research provided strong evidence for the universality of 
happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear. The South Fore had 
significant levels of agreement in interpreting facial expressions of 
these emotions.  However,  the evidence for a unique facial 
expression of surprise was not as strong. Surprise tended to be
confused with fear in this preliterate culture. All six emotions,
however, have been identified consistently in western and non­
western literate cultures (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994, Matsumoto, 
1992).
The evidence presented above is weighted towards supporting 
universality in facial expressions of emotion. To a lesser extent, the 
evidence also supports the universal experience of basic emotions. 
The present study examined emotion recognition in schizophrenia 
using the six emotions favoured by Ekman (1992, 1994) and 
Matsumoto (1992); happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, and 
fear.
1.2.2 Recognition of Facial-Affect in Non-Clinical 
P o p u la t io n s
The previous section argued that the ability to recognise emotional 
expression on other peoples' faces is universal.  This section 
rev iew s  f a c ia l - a f f e c t  r e c o g n i t io n  p e r fo rm a n c e  in normal  
populations. To investigate facial-affect  recognition in clinical 
populat ions such as schizophrenia, the performance of people 
without a mental illness is used as a standard.
Facial-affect recognition has been shown to improve with age. 
Boyatzis, Chazan, & Ting (1992) found that five-year-old children
were better at identifying emotions than three-and-a-half-year-  
olds. In another study, when judging facially depicted emotion,
adults were shown to be better at considering a broader context 
than children (Lightfoot & Bullock, 1990).
Differences in facial-affect recognition between the sexes have also 
been reported. Erwin, Gur, Gur, Skolnick, Mahwhinney-Hee, & 
Smailis (1992) found that females were more accurate judges of 
facial-affect in male than female models. Conversely, males were 
more accurate judges of facial-affect in female than male models. 
However, overall ability to judge facial-affect was not different
between the sexes.
Some emotions are more difficult to recognise than others. There is 
wide agreement that happiness is the easiest emotion to recognise 
(Gross & Ballif 1991; Matsumoto, 1992; Mazurski & Bond, 1993), 
whereas, fear is the most difficult to recognise (Matsumoto, 1992; 
Mazurski & Bond, 1993). The ease of recognition for the other 
emotions is not as clearly established. Mazurski & Bond (1993) 
presented inter-rater agreements for a series of slides depicting 
facial affect. They reported the mean percentages of inter-rater 
agreement for each emotion as follows: happiness (94.1%), surprise 
(81.8%), disgust (80.3%), sadness (79.1%), anger (74.1%), and fear
(70.4%). This research showed happiness was very easy to
recognise. Surprise, disgust and sadness, did not seem to differ 
greatly from each other, in their inter-rater agreements. The most 
difficult emotion to recognise was fear, followed by anger.
1.2.3 Recognition of Facial-Affect in
Schizophrenia and other Clinical 
P op u la t ion s .
The literature has consistently reported that clinical groups, such as 
schizophrenics and depressives,  perform less accurately  than 
normal controls on tasks of facial-affect recognition (Feinberg, et al, 
1986; Gessler, et al, 1989; Morrison, et al, 1988; Walker, et al, 
1984). Furthermore, schizophrenics have generally performed less 
accurately than depress ives on fac ia l-affect  recognit ion tasks 
(Feinberg, et al, 1986; Mandal & Rai, 1987; Persad & Polivy, 1993; 
Gur, et al, 1992; Rubinow & Post, 1992).
It was argued that the majority of research showing a deficit  
between normals and schizophrenics on facial affect recognition 
tasks was methodologically flawed, since control tasks were not 
included (Feinberg, et al, 1986; Kerr & Neale, 1993; Walker et al, 
1984). Without control tasks, it is impossible to determine whether 
the deficits in facial-affect recognition are specific to emotion 
identification, or are merely a reflection of the generalised poor 
performance in attention and perception that is characteristic of 
schizophrenia (Kerr & Neale, 1993).
Performance on facial affect recognition tasks is not only influenced 
by the pure recognition of facially expressed emotion (Kerr & Neale, 
1993). A general ability to extract information from facial features 
is also necessary, as is the ability to decode or label emotions 
visually (Walker et al, 1984). Relatively little research on the 
deficits between schizophrenics and normals has compared a facial 
emotion recognition task, and a control task of non-emotion facial 
perception. Research in this area has compared control tasks such 
as facial identity recognition (Feinberg, et al, 1986; Kerr & Neale, 
1993) and facial age-discrimination (Gessler, et al, 1989; Heimberg, 
Gur, Erwin, Shtasel, & Gur, 1992) with facial-affect recognition.
The rationale used for differential deficit  research argues that if 
schizophrenics have similar deficits on facial-affect recognition and 
non-affect facial recognition tasks, then the deficit  in facial-affect 
recognition is not specific to emotion perception. The facial-affect 
recognition deficit would be more likely to reflect a generalised 
poor performance in facial perception.
However, before this rationale can be applied the two tasks must be 
matched on item difficulty. If the tasks vary in item difficulty, any 
evidence of a differential deficit  may simply be an artefact of 
variations in item difficulty (Chapman and Chapman, 1973). The 
influence of item difficulty on differential  deficit  research is 
explained fully in the following section (1.2.3.1).
1.2.3.1 Item Difficulty: An Im portant M ethodological
Issue for Differential  Defic it  Research
C hapm an  and Chapman (1973) out l ined the methodological  
problems in deficit  research in schizophrenia. They showed that 
variations in mean item difficulty between tasks can in itself 
produce differential deficits in performance between a normal and 
a pathological  group (such as schizophrenics). This effect was
illustrated by comparing children from two age groups on varying 
diff icult ies of vocabulary items. The higher age group was 
analogous to a normal sample, while the lower age group, in this 
example, was analogous to a pathological sample.
Figurel  (from Chapman & Chapman, 1973) shows the percentage 
accuracy of a group of 34 third-grade children and a group of 39 
fifth-grade children on the vocabulary items of the Stanford-Binet 
Intel ligence Scale. Six sequential groups of vocabulary items 
comprise the x-axis on Figurel.  Each group represents a different 
level of diff iculty. Difficulty was measured by the average 
percentage accuracy for third and fifth grades. An item difficulty 
level of twenty meant that 20% of children overall passed that item. 
The easiest items, located at the greatest distance from the origin 
on the x-axis, were those which 100% of children passed.
The y-axis on Figure l ,  shows the percentage of third-grade and 
fifth-grade children who passed each set of items. As can be seen 
from F igure l ,  the curves for the two grades tend to join at the 
extremes of difficulty. This is where the items were very easy, or 
very difficult. Items that were very easy, were by passed by the 
majority  of both age groups. Similarly, items that were very 
difficult, were failed by the majority of both age groups. Hence, the 
convergence of scores between the grades, in these regions.
The greatest  separation between the curves for the grades was 
attained at about 50% item difficulty. This represented the region 
of greatest deficit between third and fifth-grade children. The 
overall structure of Figurel shows that the third-grade children are 
a group that displays lower accuracy than the fifth-grade children. 
A cei ling effect  for the vocabulary items is evident by the 
convergence of scores for very low item-difficulties. Similarly, the
convergence of scores for very difficult items merely shows a floor 
effect.  Therefore, it would be wrong to interpret Figure l  as
showing a differential deficit for third-graders, on the vocabulary 
items at 50% item-difficulty.
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F ig u r e l  Accuracy of Third and Fifth-Grade Children on Stanford- 
Binet Vocabulary items of Graded Difficulty (from 
Chapman & Chapman, 1973)
Chapman & Chapman (1973) argued that this relationship between 
difficulty and discriminating power could be generalised to any two 
groups that differ in accuracy, for example normal and pathological 
groups. Schizophrenics can be viewed as a group of low functioning 
individuals compared with a normal group. Kraepelin (1913, cited 
in N icho lson  & Nuefeld ,  1993) v iewed sch izophren ia  as 
characterised by a general decline of cognitive functioning. Bleuler 
(1911, cited in Nicholson & Nuefeld, 1993), however, believed 
schizophrenics are heterogeneous in their pattern of cognitive 
deficits with certain cognitive functions affected and others spared. 
C om m only  associated with schizophrenia  include deficits of 
executive  functions, memory, motor performance, visuo-spatia l 
performance, and attention (Rosenhan & Seligman, 1989; Lezak, 
1995) .
In Chapman & Chapman's (1973) example, the third-grade children 
are expected to be analogous to a schizophrenic group, since both
represent low accuracy. The fifth-grade group would be analogous 
to a normal group, since both represent high accuracy. Suppose a 
researcher had a facial-affect recognition task of medium difficulty 
(about 50% pass rate), and a non-emotion facial recognition task of 
significantly less difficulty (about 90% pass rate). Purely based on 
item difficulty, the researcher would find a greater deficit between 
schizophrenics and normals for the facial-affect recognition task, 
than for the non-emotion facial recognition task. A similar result 
would occur if the non-emotion facial recognition task was much 
more difficult (about 10% pass rate) than a facial-affect recognition 
task of medium difficulty (about 50% pass rate). The more difficult 
non-emotion task would have a smaller deficit than the facial-affect 
recognition task of medium difficulty.
In this way, the item difficulty of tasks can directly affect the size 
of deficit found between a normal and a pathological group. Tasks 
of differing item difficulty would be expected to show different 
levels of deficit  between the groups; medium levels of difficulty 
would evidence the greatest deficit.
1 . 2 . 3 . 2  Facia l-Affect  Recognition  Research that has
attempted to control for the effects of Item 
D i f f i c u l t y .
Some re s e a rc h e r s  have a t t em p ted  to d e te rm in e  whe ther  
schizophrenics have a differential deficit  for affect recognition by 
comparing their relative performances on a facial affect recognition 
task, and a non-affect control task matched for item difficulty. The 
research in this area is inconsistent.
Walker et al (1984) included a facial discrimination task as a 
control, and found some evidence for a specific deficit in emotion 
recognition for schizophrenics, although the overall group by task 
interaction was insignificant. Other researchers, who have included 
a control task of comparable item difficulty to the emotion 
recognition task, have found no evidence for a specific deficit in 
emotion recognition in schizophrenia (Feinberg, et al, 1986; Gessler, 
et al, 1989; Kerr & Neale, 1993).
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A possible explanation for generalised poor performance in facial 
recognition by schizophrenics ,  is deficits  in eye movement  
responses to visual stimuli, such as a face (Gordon, Coyle, Anderson, 
Healey, Cordaro, Latimer, & Meares, 1992). Gordon, et al (1992) 
found that eye movement  of schizophrenics ,  compared with 
normals, showed a reduced fixation duration to facial features 
(eyes, nose, and mouth) in the early stages (first three seconds) of 
processing a face. Another finding was that schizophrenic  
individuals had a significantly smaller number of overall fixations 
on the face than normal controls. These findings suggest impaired 
attention to, and subsequent processing of, facial stimuli by 
schizophrenics.
1 . 2 . 3 . 3  The Recognition of  Particular Emotions in
Schizophrenia  and Other Clinical  Populations.
Although the studies cited in section 1.2.3.2, controlled for item 
difficulty, they did not differentiate between the recognition of 
specific emotions. Therefore, the research did not eliminate the 
possibility that schizophrenics may have a differential deficit  for 
recognising some emotions, but not others. If there are differential 
deficits between schizophrenics and normals for the recognition of 
particular emotions, research that does not distinguish between the 
emotions would be affected by this unexplained variability. The 
resultant unexplained variability would reduce the power of this 
research. For example, suppose there is only one emotion on which 
schizophrenics experience a differential-recognition-deficit.  If this 
emotion is included in a group of non-deficit emotions, the overall 
effect size for the deficit would be substantially reduced.
Suppose the size of the deficit between a schizophrenic and normal 
group on an emotion recognition task, with a reduced effect size, is 
comparable to the size of the deficit on a control task. This result 
could be used as evidence that schizophrenics do not have a 
differential deficit for emotion recognition. The research can not 
conclude, however, that schizophrenics do not have a differential 
deficit for recognition of a particular emotion.
Facial-affect recognition research suggests that schizophrenics have 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  a b i l i t i e s  in p e rc e iv in g  p a r t i c u l a r  em o t io n s .
Schizophrenics generally display a greater deficit  compared to 
normals for perceiving negative affects (such as sadness, anger and 
fear) than for perceiving posi tive affect (such as happiness) 
(Anstadt & Krause, 1989; Bellack, Mueser,  Wade,  Sayers, & 
Morrison, 1992; Mueser, Bellack, Wade, Sayers, Tierney, & Haas, 
1993). Bellack, et al (1992) found that schizophrenics consistently 
underestimated the intensity of negative emotions (ie anger and 
distress) but were not deficient in the perception of positive 
emotional displays. Anstadt & Krause (1989) had schizophrenics 
and normals draw the various facially expressed emotions. They 
found that accuracy was the same for both groups with the 
exception of sadness where the schizophrenics had 20% of the 
action units correct and normals had 51% correct.
There is a paucity of research in the area of schizophrenic 
recognition for particular emotions, however, and the available 
research is inconclusive. Some research has found no difference in 
the ability of schizophrenics to recognise the various emotions; 
Heimberg, et al (1992) found no difference between happy and sad 
discrimination for schizophrenics. They argued this result was 
inconsis tent  with studies that have shown schizophrenics were 
worse at judging negative affect as opposed to positive affect. A 
deficiency in the literature is that most studies investigating the 
recognition of different emotions did not use the entire range of six 
basic emotions. Extensive research supports the existence of six 
basic emotions (happiness, sadness,  anger, fear, disgust,  and 
surprise) (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994). Research also suggests that 
these emotions are universal ly  exper ienced  across different  
cultures (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994; Izard, 1994).
Of the six basic emotions, four are considered negative. These are 
sadness, anger, fear, and disgust. Happiness and surprise are 
generally classed as positive emotions (Russell,  1994). Surprise, 
however, may be considered positive or negative depending on the 
source of the emotion (Ekman, 1994). An unexpected surprise can 
either be pleasant or unpleasant. For a more detailed discussion on 
the universality of emotions, refer to section 1.2.1 (page 12).
The majority of research investigating the ability of schizophrenics 
to recognise specific emotions has not incorporated all six basic
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emotions. There is a tendency to use a subset of the six basic 
emotions. For example, Heimberg, et al (1992) only compared the 
emotions of happiness and sadness, and found no evidence that 
schizophrenics performed worse on discriminating either emotion.
Kline et al (1992) investigated the performance of normals, 
paranoid schizophrenics, and nonparanoid schizophrenics, on facial- 
affect recognition of the six basic emotions. In their analysis, 
however, they grouped the six emotions into two groups, positive 
and negative. Anger, disgust, fear, and sadness, were grouped 
together as negative emotions, while happiness and surprise were 
grouped together as positive emotions. They found the three 
groups did not differ on their labelling of positive emotions. For the 
negative emotions, they found that paranoid schizophrenics and 
no rm als ,  pe rfo rm ed  s ig n i f ican t ly  be t te r  than n o npa rano id  
schizophrenics.
Although all six basic emotions were used in Kline et al's (1992) 
affect-labelling task, they did not investigate whether or not 
differences may have occurred within the classes of negative or 
positive emotions. Since no consistent investigations with the six 
basic emotions have been conducted, it has not been determined 
whether or not some negative emotions may cause a greater deficit 
than other negative emotions.
The general  f indings  that  sch izo p h ren ic s  show decreased  
performance for identifying negative emotions have been derived 
from studies that have not used the same negative emotions. Some 
research that reported schizophrenics have part icular difficulty 
recognising negative emotions, has only used one negative emotion, 
anger (Bellack, et al, 1992; Mueser, et al, 1993). Other research that 
reported schizophrenics did not have particular diff iculty with 
negative emotions,  has also only used one negative emotion, 
sadness (Heimberg, et al, 1992). It is therefore important  to 
compare the ability of schizophrenics to recognise all six basic 
emotions.
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1.2.4 Explanations for the evidence, that
Schizophrenic indiv iduals  have an Emotion  
Recognition Deficit
The major i ty  of research investigating facial-affect  recognition 
deficits in schizophrenia has not been directed by theory. The main 
focus of the research has been to determine whether  or not 
schizophrenics have difficulty recognising emotions; in particular, 
difficulty recognising negative emotions. Theoretical explanations 
have been applied ad hoc , in an attempt to explain the findings.
This sect ion summarises four theoretical  explanat ions for the 
emotion  recognit ion deficit  in schizophrenia;  the first is a 
neuropsychologica l  explanation (section 1.2.4.1). The second 
explanat ion views emotion recognition as a process of imitation 
(section 1.2.4.2). The third explanation proposes that the negative-
emotion recognition deficit is a defence mechanism to protect the 
schizophrenic (section 1.2.4.3). The fourth explanation argues that 
only nonparanoid  schizophrenics show a defic i t  for negative 
emotion recognition. Paranoid schizophrenics are not expected to 
have a deficit  due to the strong representation of negative emotions 
in their perception of other people (section 1.2.4.4). Following this,
an al ternat ive  explanation for the negative-emotion recognition 
deficit  is presented (section 1.2.4.5).
The alternative explanation argues that the apparent difficulty in 
recognising negative emotions is an artefact of item difficulty. The 
present research argues that unless the explanation offered by item 
dif f icu l ty  is discounted,  the theoretical  exp lanat ions  become 
irrelevant (for a full explanation refer to section 1.2.4.5).
1 . 2 . 4 . 1  Neuropsycholog i ca l  Exp lanat ions  for Facial -  
Affect  Recognit ion Defici ts .
Evidence that facial-affect recognition is a distinct cognitive process 
is provided by research from brain injured individuals. Ross 
(1981) found that deficits in facial-affect recognition after right 
hemisphere damage were distinct from generalised impairments in 
visuospat ia l  skills.  Humphreys,  Donnelly ,  & Riddoch (1993)
presented two case studies of individuals with face processing 
impairments. The first individual could process facial emotion but 
not facial identity, while the second could process facial identity but 
not facial emotion. This provides evidence that distinct processes 
are involved in the processing of facial identity and facial emotion.
Neuropsychological research suggests that, at least for right handed 
individuals,  facial-affect  recognition is mediated by the right 
hemisphere of the brain (Gur, Skolnick, & Gur, 1994; Luh, Redl, & 
Levy, 1994). For example, there is consistent  evidence that 
emotion recognition deficits correlate with damage to the right 
hemisphere (Rapcsak, Comer, & Rubens, 1993). Harris & Snyder 
(1992) found that the right hemispheric dominance for emotion 
perception was robust enough to be unaffected by the mood of the 
ra te r .
Facial-affect recognition deficits have been associated with damage 
to various regions of the brain. For example, poor performance on 
facial-affect recognition tasks has been noted in individuals with 
damage to the amygdala (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 
1994), the temporal lobe (Rapcsak, et al, 1993), and the frontal lobe 
(Kolb, & Taylor, 1981; Kolb, Wilson, & Taylor, 1992).
Individuals with schizophrenia often show deficits similar to those 
associated with frontal lobe impairment (Lezak, 1995; Walsh, 
1985). The frontal and prefrontal lobes of the brain are generally 
considered to control an individual's executive functions (Walsh, 
1985). Executive functions are cognitive processes that allow 
individuals to respond and adapt to their environment. Executive 
functions include abilities such as planning, sequencing,  and 
organisation of verbal and visual information. Emotion recognition 
may be another frontal ability affected in schizophrenia (Walsh, 
1985).
There is also some neuropsychological evidence that positive and 
negative emotions are processed differently. Right hemispheric 
functioning was linked with processing negative emotions, such as 
anger, whereas left hemispheric functioning was associated with 
processing positive emotions, such as happiness (Reuter-Lorenz & 
Davidson, 1981; Natale, Gur, & Gur, 1983). Other research, however,
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found no differences between brain regions involved in processing 
positive or negative affect (Etcoff, 1984).
The evidence for a distinction in the processing of negative and 
positive emotions is inconclusive. More conclusive data is needed 
to explain the greater recognition deficit  for negative, than for 
positive, emotions in schizophrenia.
1 . 2 . 4 . 2  Recognition of  Emotion via Imitat ion
Lipps (1907, cited in Walbott,  1991) proposed a theoretical 
explanation for the process of facial-affect recognition. Lipps 
postulated that emotion recognition is facilitated by an 'imitation 
drive'. He argued that people learn how facial expressions are 
related to emotions through self-perception. They relate the 
expression on their own face to the emotion they feel. When 
recognising another person's facial expression, people use the 
information gathered previously through self-perception.  Lipps 
argued that people imitate the expression they perceived, then 
attribute feelings to that expression from their prior self-perceptive 
experience. These feelings, or emotions, are then attributed to the 
other person.
Walbott (1991) examined this theory by videoing participants as 
they completed an emotion recognition task. Two weeks later, the 
participants were asked to recognise the emotional expressions on 
their own faces from the video recorded as they had completed the 
emotion recognition task. Walbott found that the correspondence 
between the rating of emotions in the original recognition task, and 
the rating of emotions from the participants'  faces, was above 
chance. This provides some indirect evidence that imitation may 
assist in emotion recognition.
If imitation is important for emotion recognition, it could be argued 
that schizophrenics who had flattened affect would perform poorly. 
Flat affect refers to a paucity of emotional expression, and is a 
symptom commonly associated with schizophrenia (Rosenhan & 
Seligman, 1989). It would be expected that schizophrenic  
individuals with flat affect would not automatically imitate the 
presented emotion. According to imitation theory, they would then
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have difficulty recognising the presented emotion. However, this 
theory does not differentiate  between different  emotions and 
would have difficulty explaining why schizophrenics have a greater 
deficit for recognising negative than positive emotions.
1 . 2 . 4 . 3  Deficits in Recognition of  Negative Emotions as a 
Psycholog ical  De fence  Mechan ism
A nother  theore tical  exp lanat ion  for the apparen t  d iff iculty  
schizophrenics have recognising negative emotions is that the 
deficit  is part of a defence mechanism. It was argued that a 
defence mechanism (conscious or unconscious)  protected the 
schizophrenic against the stress caused by the perception of 
negative emotions in others (Bellack, et al, 1992).
The defence mechanism theory was linked with studies of 
expressed emotion (Bellack, et al, 1992). Expressed emotion refers 
to the expression of negative emotion. High expressed emotion in 
families of schizophrenics has been associated with higher relapse 
rates among schizophrenics (Bellack, et al, 1992; Mueser, et al, 
1993). It was argued that problems with recognising negative 
emotion may be a defence for schizophrenics in environments with 
high expressed emotion.
Bellack, et al, (1992) forwarded the defence mechanism theory as a 
possible explanation for schizophrenics'  difficulty with negative- 
affect recognition. They also acknowledged the possibility that 
attention difficulties, or a neuropsychological deficit, could explain 
the results. There was no empirical evidence to suppoii  the
defence mechanism explanation.
1 . 2 . 4 . 4  Greater Cognit ive  Representat ion of  Negat ive  
Emotions for Paranoid,  than Nonparanoid,  
S c h i z o p h r e n i c s .
Kline et al (1993) presented evidence that only nonparanoid 
schizophrenics, and not paranoid schizophrenics, have a deficit in 
negative emotion recognition. The groups did not differ on their 
recognition of positive emotions. However,  nonparanoids were 
s ignif icant ly  poorer  at recognis ing  negat ive  emotions  than
paranoids and normals. Kline et al concluded that the difficulty 
recognising negative emotions is not a general schizophrenic deficit, 
but is limited to the poorly organised emotional  schema of 
nonparanoid schizophrenics.
The result that paranoid schizophrenics did not have a deficit for 
negative emotion recognition supported Kline et al's (1993) theory 
that  paranoid schizophrenics have a strong representat ion of 
negative emotions in their perception of other people. Paranoid 
schizophrenics commonly experience delusions of persecution and 
interference that could make them more aware of negative 
emotions in others (Kline et al, 1993).
Kline et al's (1993) theory has intuitive appeal, however they did 
not acknowledge that their results could also be explained by the 
differential item difficulties between positive and negative emotion 
recognition tasks (for explanation refer to section 1.2.4.5, page 27).
1.2.4.5 An Alternative Explanat ion why Schizophrenic
indiv iduals ,  have Spec i f ic  D if f icu lty  Recognis ing  
Negative Emotions: An Artefact of Item
D i f f i c u l t y .
An alternative explanation to those in the preceding sections 
(1.2.4.1 to 1.2.4.4), is that findings of a greater deficit in recognising 
negative (as opposed to positive) emotions is merely an artefact of 
differential difficulties in perceiving the emotions. With all other 
variables controlled, items of medium difficulty would show the 
greatest deficit between a normal and pathological group. Items of 
extremely high and extremely low diff iculty  would show a 
comparatively reduced deficit  between the groups (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1973, for a more detailed explanation refer to section 
1.2.3.1 on page 17).
Research supports that, for normal adults, negative emotions are 
more difficult to recognise than positive emotions (Matsumoto, 
1992; Mazurski & Bond, 1993; Kline et al, 1993). Similarly, 
research supports that for clinical groups such as individuals with 
schizophrenia or depression, negative emotions are more difficult to 
recognise than positive emotions, (Morrison, et al, 1988; Walker, et
28
al, 1984; refer also to section 1.2.3.3, page 20). Research also 
supports that clinical groups (such as schizophrenics),  show a 
greater deficit , compared with the abilities of normals, in the 
recognition of negative than positive emotions (Anstadt & Krause, 
1989; Bellack, et al 1992; Mueser, et al, 1993; refer also to section 
1.2.3.3, page 20).
This  pattern of results suggests that  posit ive emotions are 
extremely easy to recognise. If positive emotions are extremely 
easy to recognise, neither a normal nor a pathological group would 
be expected to have part icular diff iculty recognising positive 
emotions. Therefore, there would not be a deficit between the 
normal and pathological group for the recognition of positive 
emotions .
Furthermore,  the pattern of results suggests that recognition of 
negative emotions is at a medium level of difficulty. If this is true, 
a clinical group would be expected to show a deficit, compared to 
normals, in the recognition of negative emotions (refer to section 
1.2.3.1, page 17).
To summarise, if the most difficult items (that is the negative 
emotions) are of medium difficulty, it would be expected that 
schizophrenics would show a greater deficit  in those items, 
compared with the easier positive affect recognition items. This 
argument is consistent with the available evidence. For example, in 
Mazurski & Bond (1993) happiness was correctly identified by 
94.1% of participants on average. This represents an extremely 
easy task. The negative emotions (anger, sadness, disgust, and fear) 
were correct ly  identified by between 70.4 and 80.3% of 
participants. The task of identifying negative emotions was not 
extremely easy or difficult, but was within a medium range of 
diff iculty.
Item difficulty can also explain the results of Kline et al (1993) who 
found that paranoid schizophrenics and normals outperformed 
nonparanoid schizophrenics in recognising negative emotions. The 
groups were equivalent in their perception of positive emotions.
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Research suggests that paranoid schizophrenia is a less severe form 
of the illness than nonparanoid schizophrenia (Nicholson & Neufeld, 
1993; refer also to section 1.1.3.2, page 7). This suggests that 
paranoid schizophrenics would perform with greater accuracy, in 
general,  than nonparanoid schizophrenics. Chapman & Chapman 
(1973) argued that a less accurate group was expected to show a 
deficit, compared with a more accurate group, for tasks of moderate 
difficulty. The groups were expected to be equivalent in accuracy 
for tasks of extremely low or high difficulty.
Kline et al (1993) suggested that, for recognising positive emotions, 
a ceiling effect may have caused the equivalence between the 
paranoid and nonparanoid groups. This explanation suggests that 
the results were caused by item difficulty. They went on to argue 
that  the d ifference  between the paranoid  and nonparanoid  
schizophrenics in recognising negative emotions, supported their 
theory that nonparanoid schizophrenics had a less developed 
cognit ive  representat ion for negative emotions than paranoid 
schizophrenics (refer to section 1.2.4.4, page 26). However, this 
explanation does not advocate item difficulty as the cause of the 
resu l ts .
Kline et al (1993) attributed the equivalence between the groups on 
the recognition of positive emotions to the positive items being too 
easy. An i tem-difficulty explanat ion would suggest  that the
difference found between the groups on the recognition of negative 
emotions was due to the moderate level of difficulty for those 
negative items (refer also to section 1.2.3.1, page 17, for an 
explanation of the effects of item difficulty on deficit research).
Kline et al (1993) were inconsistent in the explanation of their 
results. They presented item difficulty as a possible explanation for 
half of their results, but did not acknowledge that item difficulty 
could explain all of their results. This was a serious oversight by 
Kline et al (1993), which detracts from the theoretical explanation 
of their results.
Morrison, et al (1988) reviewed facial-affect recognition research in 
schizophrenia. They stated that there was no research specifically 
testing whether item difficulty could explain differential deficits
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be tw een  p o s i t iv e  and n e g a t iv e  em o t io n  r e c o g n i t io n  in 
schizophrenics.  There has also been a paucity of research 
examining the six basic emotions in this context. Most research 
used one example of a positive, and one or two examples of a 
negative, emotion (refer to section 1.2.3.3, page 20).
The present research sought to determine what pattern of deficits, 
between normals and schizophrenics, emerged when all six basic 
emotions were considered. If the emotion recognition deficits in 
schizophrenia can be explained simply by item difficulty, the 
proposal of theoretical explanations (such as those in sections
1.2.4.1 to 1.2.4.4) would be redundant. The position of theoretical 
explanations would be considerably strengthened, however, if a 
pattern of results is evident that can not be explained by item 
difficulty.
1.3 THE PRESENT STUDY
1.3.1 Experiment One
E x p er im en t  one was conducted  with te r t ia ry  s tuden ts  as 
participants. The task used in the present study was a facial-affect 
labelling task. Participants were given a choice of six emotions 
from which to label each face. The six emotions were happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust,  surprise, and fear. These are widely 
considered to be six universal emotions (refer to section 1.2.1, page 
12) .
1.3.1.1 Ai ms
The purpose of experiment one was to pilot the facial-affect  
recognition task. The pilot aimed to determine the relative item 
difficulties for each of the six basic emotions.
1.3.1.2 H y p o t h e s e s
Experiment one had the following hypotheses:
1. In accordance with the l iterature,  it was predicted that
negative emotions would be more difficult to recognise than 
positive emotions (refer to section 1.2.2, page 14).
2. The specific order of difficulty for the six emotions, was
predicted to correspond wi th Mazurski & Bond (1993). 
Happiness was predicted to be the easiest  emotion to
recognise, followed in order by surprise, disgust,  sadness, 
anger, and fear.
3. Experiment one predicted that no sex differences would be
evident in performance of the facial-affect recognition task.
1.3.2 E xperim ent Two
Experiment two was conducted with four groups of participants. 
Paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics were the target groups. 
Participants with no history of mental illness were a normal control 
group. Depressed participants served as a clinical control group.
1.3.2.1 A i m s
Experiment two was designed to test whether or not there are 
differential deficits in the perception of the six basic emotions 
between normals, depressives, and schizophrenics. Furthermore, it 
aimed to determine whether or not the pattern of differences 
between the groups can be explained simply by variations in item 
difficulty. If differences between the groups can be explained by 
item difficulty, a true differential deficit can not be postulated for 
the recognition of specific emotions in schizophrenia.
1.3.2.2 H y p o t h e s e s
The second experiment used the facial-affect  recognition task 
designed for experiment one to test the following hypotheses:
4. That on average, nonparanoid schizophrenics will perform less 
accurately than paranoid schizophrenic participants on the 
emotion labelling tasks.
5. That on average, paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics 
will perform more poorly than depressed and normal 
participants on the emotion labelling tasks.
6. That  on average, depressed persons will perform less 
accurately than normal persons on the emotion labelling 
tasks.
7. The differences in performance deficit among the four groups, 
on the six emotion labelling tasks, will be as expected from 
the relative item difficulties of the emotion labelling tasks.
In explanation of hypothesis four, it is predicted that the groups
will not differ in their relative performances across the six emotion
categories. This means that each group will agree on the easiest 
and the most difficult emotions to recognise. Each group is
expected to have an equivalent progression of accuracy on the 
emotion labelling tasks.
There is not expected to be an interaction effect  between
participant group and emotion task. If an interaction effect is 
evident, it is expected to reflect a ceiling and/or a floor effect. This 
would show the groups' performance converging for very easy, 
and/or very difficult, items.
Chapter Two
METHOD
2.1 EXPERIMENT ONE
2.1.1 Sample
Fifty-eight first year psychology students from the Australian 
National University comprised the present sample. The students 
sampled ranged from 18 to 42 years of age (mean age = 23, 
standard deviation = 6). There were 36 female (62%), and 22 male 
(38%), participants. With females coded as 1, and males as 2, the 
mean for sex of participant was 1.38 (standard deviation = 0.50).
All participants were right handed, to control for any differences in 
performance due to handedness. Handedness has been related to
cerebral  hemisphere  organisat ion and funct ioning (Harshman, 
Hampson, & Berebaum, 1983).
No participant had a history of psychiatric illness, severe head 
injury, alcohol abuse, or drug abuse. Students  participated 
voluntarily and received credit toward their psychology course for 
participation in the study.
2.1.2 Design
The first hypothesis for experiment  one predicted differences 
between mean item-difficulties for the six depicted emotions for 
normal participants. Specifically, it was predicted that positive 
emotions (happiness and surprise), would be easier to recognise
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than negative emotions (sadness, fear, anger, and disgust). The 
second hypothesis predicted there would not be a sex difference in 
performance of the facial-affect recognition task.
To test these hypotheses, a split plot factorial design was employed. 
Accuracy on the facial-affect recognition task was the dependent 
variable. There were two independent variables. The first was sex 
of participant, comprising two levels, female and male. This was a 
between subjects' variable. The second independent variable was 
emotion, comprising six levels: happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, 
surprise, and fear. This was a within subjects' variable.
Russell (1994) criticised the use of within-subjects designs for 
facial-affect recognition studies. He argued that recognition scores 
were inflated when participants viewed all emotion types within a 
short time. It was claimed that such exposure did not occur in 
everyday encounters with facial expression. Russell believed that 
b e tw een-sub jec ts  des igns  should  be used for  fac ia l -a f fec t  
recognition tasks. Matsumoto & Ekman, (1988, cited in Russell, 
1994) was a between-subjects emotion recognition study that failed 
to verify the strength of results found in within-subjects studies. 
Russell argued that the failure of this between-subjects study to 
replicate the strong results of within-subjects studies cast doubt on 
the universality of emotions.
There are two problems with Russell's argument for the disuse of 
within-subjects designs. The first problem is that it is uncommon 
for emotions to be viewed in total isolation of each other in 
everyday experience (Ekman, 1994). The second problem with 
Russell's argument results from a well-known statistical property of 
between-subjects designs; they are less statistically powerful than 
within-subjects designs. Within-subjects designs do not have the 
inter-subject variability that reduces the main effect size in a 
between-subjects design (Kirk, 1982). This statistical difference
between the designs may explain why the strength of results in the 
reported between-subjects study was less than that of the within- 
subjects studies.
The within groups design employed by the present study for the 
emotion variable also served as an experimental control.  The
within  groups design  con tro l led  for d i f fe ren ces  between 
participants on the dependent variable (emotion recognition score), 
as each participant completed all six levels of the independent 
variable (emotion).
Other  control measures were intr icately  associated with the 
experimental procedure and are discussed in that section (2.1.4, 
page 36).
2.1.3 Materials
A selection of the pictures of facial affect, developed by Mazurski & 
Bond (1993), were used as stimuli for the current research. These 
slides were validated by studies of rater agreement with an 
Australian sample of about 100 participants. The slides were 
bought , from Mazurski & Bond, on CD-ROM for Macintosh 
com pute rs .
There was a total of thirty slides selected for use in the current 
design; five slides for each of the six depicted emotions. The slides 
were selected to retain the average item difficulty of each emotion 
as reported in Mazurski & Bond (1993). This was so the present 
results could be reasonably compared to those of Mazurski and 
Bond (1993). There were two criteria for slide selection. The first 
was that the rater agreement for each slide, was close to the mean 
rater  agreement  for that emotion group. The mean rater 
agreement, as reported in Mazurski & Bond (1993), was calculated 
for each group of slides depicting one emotion. Slides with a rater 
agreement close to this mean were chosen for the present research. 
The second criterion for slide selection was that the mean rater 
agreement for the five selected slides, for each emotion, closely 
approximated the mean rater agreement from that emotion group 
as a whole. Slides for the present study were chosen with rater 
agreements above and below the reported mean rater agreement. 
This choice was made so that the selected slides, for a particular 
emotion, had a mean rater agreement close to the mean for the 
entire selection of slides for that emotion (as reported in Mazurski 
& Bond; refer to Appendix A for calculations used in slide selection, 
and the list of slides selected for use in the current design).
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Apparatus used in the current  exper im ent  was a computer  
program, designed on the Psyscope software package, installed on a 
Macintosh computer. For the present research the slides were 
reduced in size from Mazurski & Bond's originals. This served to 
reduce the time taken for the psyscope program to display the 
sides. The large size of the original slides required large amount of 
memory causing a long time delay between pressing the space bar 
and viewing the slide. The slides in the current program were 
35mm wide by 47mm long. The details of the program are
described in the procedure (section 2.1.4, page 36).
2.1 .4  P rocedure
To begin their involvement the part icipants  provided general 
demographic  information (age, sex, and level of education).  
Participants were then instructed how to complete the facial-affect 
recognition task (described in section 2.1.4.1.2, page 38). The
instructions to participants were as follows:
"On the computer screen you will be presented with pictures of people's 
faces, one at a time. Before each face comes onto the screen, you will be 
prompted by the computer to press the space bar on the keyboard 
(researcher points to the space bar). This will make the next face appear on 
the screen, so make sure you are watching the screen when you press the 
space bar.
After the face leaves the screen, the computer will prompt you to press the 
key that corresponds to the emotion you thought was on that face. The 
emotions are happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, and fear 
(researcher points to each response key in turn). Do you have any questions 
before you begin?"
The part icipant’s questions were answered,  then they completed 
the facial-affect  recognition task. Any further  quest ions the 
participants had about the study were then answered. Finally, the 
participants were thanked for their help with the study.
2.1.4.1 Facial -af fect  recogni t ion task
2.1.4.1.1 Issues surrounding  fac ial -af fec t  r ecogni t ion  tasks
There are two main paradigms that have been used to test facial- 
affect recognition. These are emotion-discrimination and emotion­
labelling.
An emotion-discrimination trial involves the presentation of two 
faces to an individual, who determines whether the faces portray 
the same or different emotions. Emotion-labelling trials involve the 
presentation of one face and a list of emotions to an individual. 
They then have to decide which of the listed emotions corresponds 
to the emotion portrayed by the face. The majority of research in 
the area of facial-affect recognition has used one of these two tasks, 
most commonly emotion-labelling (Morrison, et al, 1988).
A number of methodological  issues concerning  fac ia l-affect  
recognition tasks were raised by Russell (1994). Russell argued 
that recognition scores in facial-affect recognition research may 
have been inflated by: participants previewing the faces before the 
actual recognition task; the order of presentation of the faces; the 
use of within subjects design; and the use of a forced choice 
response format.
Russell (1994) argued that participants who knew the range of 
emotions to be tested, and had seen the entire range of expression 
types, would be advantaged in the subsequent recognition task. 
Previewing the faces, before the recognition task, was suggested to 
highlight similarities within, and differences between, expression 
types. The percentage of correct responses in the recognition task 
may therefore have been inflated in studies where participants had 
previewed the entire range of stimulus material (Russell,  1994). 
For this reason, the present study did not allow participants to 
preview the stimulus material prior to the recognition task.
Another problem was when the order of presentation of faces was 
the same for each participant. This would be likely to result in 
order effects. Participants would have an identical  context, 
provided by the previous stimulus presentations, in which to judge
each face. This would be likely to inflate agreement between 
participants (Russell,  1994). To control for order effects, the 
present study used random orders of stimulus presentation for 
each participant. This meant that no participant was likely to 
receive the same order of stimulus presentation.
The final criticism Russell (1994) made of facial-affect recognition 
tasks was the use of a forced choice response format. Russell 
argued that a restricted range of emotion labels may not include a 
label the participant thought would be most appropriate  for a 
particular stimulus. He argued this restriction in response choice 
would artificially inflate inter-rater  agreement.  In reply to 
Russell's criticism, Ekman (1994) argued that given the restricted
choice, the fact that participants from varied cultures agreed on 
what labels to choose for particular expressions, was evidence for 
universality of emotions. Ekman (1994) argued it was irrelevant
whether individuals would choose the same or a different set of 
labels given a free-choice. The high level of agreement between 
people using the labels provided was evidence for the utility of the 
labels for research purposes.
2 . 1 . 4 . 1 . 2  The facial-affect recognition task used for the 
p r e se n t  r e se a r c h .
The present task was designed for use with normal, schizophrenic, 
and depressed individuals.
The task used in the present study was a facial-affect labelling task 
(refer to section 2.1.4.1.1, page 37). Participants were given a 
choice of six emotions from which to label each face. The six
emotions were: happiness, sadness, anger, disgust,  surprise, and 
fear. These have been widely considered to be six universal
emotions (refer to section 1.2.1, page 12).
There was a total of thirty trials in the experiment, comprising five 
trials for each of the six emotions. Participants were not allowed to 
preview the pictures before the actual task (as recommended by 
Russell, 1994; refer to section 2.1.4.1.1, page 37). The trial orders 
were randomised in a simultaneous design. This meant that each 
participant had a different, randomly selected, order of stimulus
presentation. The simultaneous design controlled for order effects, 
as well as practice and fatigue effects. Previous research has been 
criticised for not using different orders of presentation for each 
participant (refer to section 2.1.4.1.1, page 37).
The facial-affect recognition task was programmed on a Macintosh 
computer .  Schizophrenic  ind iv idua ls  often have attention 
difficulties, and have been associated with an inability to focus and 
sustain attention to relevant stimuli (Chapman & Chapman, 1973; 
Garmezy, 1977, Place & Gilmore, 1980). To control for poor 
performance due to inattention, part icipants  were prompted to 
press the space bar to display the stimulus. This was to ensure 
they were attending to the screen when the st imulus was 
displayed. After pressing the space bar, the part icipants were 
presented with an image of a face expressing a particular emotion.
There has been a wide range of exposure times used in the 
literature for facial-affect recognition tasks; Feinberg et al (1986) 
used tachistoscopic presentations of about 500 ms, Heimberg et al 
(1992) had a seven second duration, while Kerr & Neale (1993) 
used an exposure time of fifteen seconds. Considering that in real 
life situations people often change their emotional expressions quite 
rapidly, brief exposure times are considered more ecologically valid 
(Morrison et al, 1988).
The stimulus duration for the present design was also influenced by 
the aforementioned concern that people with schizophrenia have 
problems attending to stimuli. If the exposure time in the current 
design was too brief, the schizophrenic participants may have 
performed poorly solely due to their attention difficulties.
The present design used a stimulus exposure duration of three 
seconds (as used in Borod, Martin, Alpert, Brozgold, & Welkowitz, 
1993). This was considered a brief enough duration to approximate 
ecological validity, while being long enough in duration to allow for 
schizophrenic participants' attention difficulties.
After the termination of the stimulus participants were prompted 
to identify which emotion had been portrayed. They were 
presented with a list of the six emotions on the screen. The
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emotions were listed in six orders with each emotion having an 
equal chance of being presented in each position. The presentation 
of the six orders of listed emotions was randomised for every trial. 
This was to control for the possibility of a tendency to choose the 
response presented in a particular position.
Participants responded by pressing the response key corresponding 
to the emotion they perceived to be depicted. The numbers one 
through six on the main keyboard were used as response keys for 
the six emotions (1 = happiness, 2 = sadness, 3 = anger, 4 = disgust, 
5 = surprise, 6 = fear). The number corresponding to each emotion 
was chosen randomly. The response keys were clearly labelled
with the name of the emotion they represented.
The response keys were not changed between trials so participants 
could become accustomed to the keys. This was to reduce errors 
due to unfamiliarity, or confusion, with the response keys. The 
order of response keys was not expected to influence participant 
responses, because the order of emotions presented on the monitor 
was randomised.
The participants had a limited time of fifteen seconds to respond 
before the presentation of the next trial. This was considered 
ample time to respond, and helped limit the overall time taken to 
run the experiment.
2.2 EXPERIMENT TWO 
2.2.1 Sample
The present sample comprised four groups of participants. The 
p r e s e n t  s tudy  in v e s t i g a t e d  f a c i a l - a f f e c t  r e c o g n i t i o n  in 
schizophrenia. The current schizophrenic sample was divided into 
paranoid and nonparanoid groups to test the hypothesis  that 
paranoid schizophrenics perform more accurately than nonparanoid 
schizophrenics on facial-affect  recognition. The target clinical 
samples comprised 19 people with a current diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia (4 female, 16 male), and 14 people with a current 
diagnosis of nonparanoid schizophrenia (2 female, 12 male).
Nineteen people with no psychiatric history (4 females, 16 males) 
were included as a normal control group to provide a standard 
against which to compare the schizophrenic groups. Sixteen people 
with a current diagnosis of major depressive episode (8 female, 8 
male) were included as a clinical control group. The depressed 
group was included to control for the general effects of having a 
p sych ia t r ic  i llness, such as the exper ience  of psychiatr ic  
hospitalisations. The schizophrenic groups were hypothesised to 
perform less accurately than the depressed group. That  the 
depressives, unlike the schizophrenics, did not experience psychotic 
thought disorder indicated that schizophrenic difficulties would be 
associated with their particular illness and not with the presence of 
a general psychiatric condition.
To control for any differences in performance due to handedness all 
participants were right handed. Handedness has been related to 
cerebral hemisphere organisation and functioning (Harshman, et al, 
1983). All participants were voluntary, and were informed of the 
research rationale before consenting to their involvement with the 
s tudy .
Schizophrenic  and depressed part icipants were recruited from 
major inpatient psychiatric services within the Australian Capital 
Territory and New South Wales, as well as from community based 
rehabil i ta t ion services for people  with a psychiatr ic  illness. 
Par t ic ipants  from the clinical samples were referred to the 
experiment  by staff of the recruitment organisation. The current 
psychiatric diagnosis was the basis for participant selection.
Clinical participants were interviewed by the researcher after they 
consented to the experiment. The interview centred on the Maine 
Scale of Paranoid and Nonparanoid Schizophrenia (Magaro, et al, 
1981), and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall & 
Gorham, 1962).
The Maine scale (described in section 2.2.3.1, page 46) was used to 
d iv id e  the sch izophren ic  p a r t i c ip a n ts  in to  pa ran o id  and 
nonparanoid samples. To divide schizophrenic participants into the 
two groups a cut-off score of 12 on the Maine Paranoid Scale, and a 
cut-off score of 10 on the Maine Nonparanoid Scale, with at least a
3 point difference between the scales, was used (as recommended 
in Magaro et al, 1981).
The BPRS (described in section 2.2.3.2, page 49) was used as an 
indicator of symptom severity for the three clinical groups (for 
example Geyer & Braff, 1982; Kline et al, 1992; Lukoff, Liberman, & 
Nuechterlein, 1986; Muzekari & Bates, 1977).
Potential participants were excluded from the study if they had a 
history of drug or alcohol abuse, or had suffered a severe head 
injury. Cases of suspected drug induced psychoses or organic brain 
damage, were not included in the current sample.
The following sections (2.2.1.1 to 2.2.1.4) present  the sample 
characteristics of the four groups in detail. Table 3 presents a 
summary of sample characteristics for the four groups.
2.2 .1.1 The Paranoid Schizophrenic  Sample
The paranoid schizophrenic sample was selected on the basis that
they fulfil the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia - paranoid type 
(refer to Table 2 on page 5). Participants from the paranoid 
schizophrenic sample ranged from 17 to 65 years of age (mean age 
= 40 years, standard deviation = 16). There were 4 female (20%) 
and 16 male (80%) participants. With females coded as 1 and males 
as 2 the mean for sex of participant was 1.8 (standard deviation = 
0.4). The educational attainment for this group ranged from less 
than four years of high school (less than 10 years), to completion of 
tert iary studies (more than 14 years).  The mean level of 
educational attainment was the completion of four years of high
school (mean = 10 years, standard deviation = 2).
The duration of psychiatric illness for the paranoid sample ranged
from one year to forty years (mean = 19 years, standard deviation 
= 15). The number of hospitalisations for psychiatric reasons, 
including the current one for hospitalised participants, ranged from 
1 to over 20 (mean = 5.6, standard deviation = 5.8).
For the paranoid schizophrenic  sample ,  the Maine Paranoid 
Subscale scores ranged from 12 to 19, with a mean of 13.6
(standard deviation = 2.0). The Maine Nonparanoid Subscale scores 
ranged from 5 to 10, with a mean of 7.3 (standard deviation = 1.8). 
The BPRS scores ranged from 24 to 53, with a mean of 38.3 
(standard deviation = 7.21).
Table 3
M eans and Standard Deviations for Sample Characteristics of the 
Paranoid. Nonparanoid. Depressed and Normal Samples.
Age Education Length
of
illness
Hospital­
isations
Maine
Paranoid
Score
Maine
Non­
paranoid
Score
BPRS
Paranoid
n=19
Mean 40.2 10.1 19.1 5.6 13.6 7.3 38.3
St. Dev. 15.7 2.08 15.13 5.8 2.0 1.8 7.21
Non­
paranoid
n=14
Mean 39.1 10.6 19.8 5.3 5.6 10.75 32.7
St. Dev. 13.0 2.62 14.03 5.8 0.7 1.2 7.10
Depressed
n=16
Mean 45.4 10.7 16.6 7.8 5.3 5.3 34.3
St. Dev. 11.1 2.5 14.5 6.2 0.4 0.6 5.57
Normal
n=20
Mean 34.8 11.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
St. Dev. 14.8 1.8
N/A = not applicable
2.2 .1 .2  The Nonparanoid Sch izophren ic  Sample
The nonparanoid schizophrenic sam ple was selected on the basis 
that they fulfil the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia (refer to Table 
1, page 2), but did not fulfil the criteria for paranoid type (criteria 
presented in Table 2, page 5). Participants from the nonparanoid 
schizophrenic sample ranged from 25 to 63 years of age (mean age 
= 39, standard deviation = 13). There were 2 female (14.3%) and
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12 male (85.7%) participants. With females coded as 1 and males 
as 2 the mean for sex of participant was 1.86 (standard deviation = 
0.36). The educational attainment for this group ranged from less 
than four years of high school (less than 10 years), to completion of 
tert iary studies (more than 14 years).  The mean level of
educational attainment was the completion of four years of high 
school (mean = 11 years, standard deviation = 2.6).
The duration of psychiatric illness for the nonparanoid sample 
ranged from one year to forty years (mean = 20 years, standard 
deviation = 14). The number of hospitalisations for psychiatric 
reasons, including the current one for hospitalised participants, 
ranged from 1 to 20 (mean = 5.3, standard deviation = 5.8).
For the nonparanoid schizophrenic sample, the Maine Paranoid 
Subscale scores ranged from 5 to 7, with a mean of 5.6 (standard 
deviation = 0.7). The Maine Nonparanoid Subscale scores ranged 
from 10 to 13, with a mean of 10.75 (standard deviation = 1.2).
The BPRS scores ranged from 24 to 44, with a mean of 32.7 
(standard deviation = 7.10).
2.2 .1.3  The Depressed Sample
The depressed sample was selected on the basis that they fulfil the 
DSM-IV criteria for major depressive episode (criteria presented in 
Appendix B). The depressed group were all hospitalised at the time 
of testing. Participants from the depressed sample ranged from 26
to 60 years of age (mean age = 45, standard deviation = 11). There
were 8 female (50%) and 8 male (50%) participants. With females 
coded as 1 and males as 2 the mean for sex of participant was 1.5 
(standard deviation = 0.5). The educational attainment for this 
group ranged from less than four years of high school (less than 10 
years), to completion of tertiary studies (more than 14 years). The 
mean level of educational attainment was the completion of four 
years of high school (mean = 11 years, standard deviation = 2.5).
The duration of psychiatric illness for the depressed sample ranged 
from one year to forty years (mean = 17 years, standard deviation 
= 15). The number of hospitalisations for psychiatric reasons,
including the current one for hospitalised participants, ranged from 
1 to 20 (mean = 7.8, standard deviation = 6.2).
For the depressed sample, the Maine Paranoid Subscale scores 
ranged from 5 to 6, with a mean of 5.3 (standard deviation = 0.4). 
The Maine Nonparanoid Subscale scores ranged from 5 to 7, with a 
mean of 5.3 (standard deviation = 0.6). The BPRS scores ranged 
from 24 to 45, with a mean of 34.3 (standard deviation = 5.57).
2.2.1.4 The Normal Sample
Participants from the normal sample ranged from 20 to 60 years of 
age (mean age = 35, standard deviation = 15). There were 4 female 
(21.1%) and 15 male (77.9%) participants. With females coded as 1 
and males as 2 the mean for sex of participant was 1.79 (standard 
deviation = 0.42). The educational attainment for this group ranged 
from less than four years of high school (less than 10 years), to 
completion of tertiary studies (more than 14 years). The mean 
level of educational attainment was the completion of five to six 
years of high school (mean = 12 years, standard deviation = 1.8). 
Normal participants were recruited from community groups in the 
Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales.
2.2.2 Design
The first three hypotheses for experiment two predicted the four 
groups would show differing levels of performance on the emotion 
recognition task. The first hypothesis stated that the nonparanoid 
schizophrenic group would perform more poorly on the emotion 
recognition task than the paranoid schizophrenic, depressed, and 
normal groups. The second hypothesis was that nonparanoid and 
paranoid schizophrenic participants would perform more poorly 
than depressed and normal participants on the emotion labelling 
tasks. The third hypothesis was that depressed participants would 
perform more poorly than normals on the emotion labelling tasks. 
The fourth hypothesis was that differences in performance deficit, 
between the normal sample and the three clinical groups on the six 
emotion labelling tasks, would be as predicted by item difficulty.
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To test these hypotheses, a split plot factorial design was employed. 
Accuracy on the facial-affect recognition tasks was the dependent 
variable. There were two independent variables. The first was 
participant group, comprising four levels: paranoid schizophrenic; 
nonparanoid schizophrenic; depressed; and normal. This was a 
between subjects' variable. The second independent variable was 
emotion, comprising of six levels: happiness; sadness; anger; disgust; 
surprise; and fear. This was a within subjects' variable.
2.2 .2.1 Control  M easures
Control  measures included the within groups' design, which
controlled for differences between participants on the dependent 
variable (emotion recognition), since each participant completed
every level of the independent variable (emotion depicted).
Other control measures were intr icately associated with the 
experimental procedure and are discussed in that section (2.2.4, 
page 50).
2.2.3 M ater ia ls
Materials for experiment two were as described for experiment one 
(section 2.1.3, page 35). Two additional measures were used in 
experiment two, as described below.
2.2.3.1 The Maine Scale of Paranoid and Nonparanoid
S c h i z o p h r e n i a
The Maine Scale (presented in Appendix C) was developed by 
Vojtisek (1976 - cited in Magaro et al, 1981). The scale comprised 
two subscales; the paranoid subscale, and the nonparanoid subscale. 
Each subscale consisted of five items. The five items in the 
paranoid subscale, and three of the items in the nonparanoid 
subscale, were taken from the Venables & O'Conner (1959 - cited in 
Magaro et al, 1981) Short Scale for Rating Paranoid Schizophrenia. 
The two addit ional  items for the nonparanoid subscale  were 
adapted from symptoms included in Overall & Gorham's (1962) 
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (refer to section 2.2.3.2).
The paranoid items refer to overt expressions of hostility, and 
delusions of persecution, control, reference, and grandeur. The two 
nonparanoid items taken from the BPRS refer  to cognit ive  
disorganisation and hallucinations. The other three nonparanoid 
i tems refer  to time d iso r ien ta t ion ,  unusual  pos tures ,  and 
incongruous emotional responses.
The ratings for the five items for each scale, are summed to give 
total scores for paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia. Magaro, 
et al (1981) suggested cut-off scores, on the subscales, for dividing 
schizophrenic individuals into paranoid and nonparanoid. They 
suggested a cut-off score of twelve for the paranoid scale, and ten 
for the nonparanoid scale, with at least a three-point difference 
between the paranoid and nonparanoid scales. For example, 
suppose an individual scored fourteen points on the paranoid 
subscale and eleven points on the nonparanoid subscale. This 
individual would be classified as paranoid, since they had scored 
more than twelve points on the paranoid subscale, and their 
nonparanoid score was three points less than their paranoid score.
Magaro, et al (1981) conducted reliability and validity tests of the 
Maine Scale with a sample including paranoid and nonparanoid 
schizophrenics, and a variety of other clinical diagnoses including 
depression. The test-retest reliability of the Maine Scale was 
adequate for both the nonparanoid subscale (r=.73, p<.001, n=26), 
and the paranoid subscale (r=.89, p<.001, n=26).
The inter-rater reliability of the Maine Scale was also adequate 
(Magaro, et al, 1981). Inter-rater  rel iabilities of two raters' , 
measured by Spearmen rank-order correlations, were .61 for the 
paranoid subscale and .77 for the nonparanoid subscale. This was 
consistent with the inter-rater reliability (.69) of the two raters on 
the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) of Spitzer, Endicott, & Robbins 
(1978). The Spearmen rank-order correlation between the raters 
diagnoses from the Maine Scale, and diagnoses made using the RDC 
was .71.
Magaro, et al (1981) investigated the construct validity of the 
Maine Scale by two methods. The first method was to compare 
scores on variables, previously shown to distinguish paranoid from
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nonparanoid schizophrenics, for individuals rated as paranoid or 
nonparanoid based on the Maine Scale. They found that paranoids', 
diagnosed by the Maine scale, significantly outperformed Maine 
Scale diagnosed nonparanoids'  on measures  of reaction time, 
Stanford-Binet IQ score, and the Expanded Similarities Test (all 
cited in Magaro, et al, 1981). This was consistent  with the 
l i te ra ture  reports  of pa ranoid  sch izophren ics  ou tperform ing  
nonparanoids on these, and similar, measures (Magaro, et al, 1981; 
refer also to sectionl.1.3.2 on page 7 for differences in functioning 
between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics).
The second method Magaro, et al, (1981) used to investigate 
construct validity was a factor analytic design. They found four
factors using a principal component solution and a varimax rotation. 
Four of the paranoid subscale items (PI ,  P2, P4 and P5) loaded 
strongly on the first factor. Four of the nonparanoid items (NI, N2, 
N3, and N4) loaded strongly on the second factor. The remaining 
paranoid  (P3 - grandeur) , and nonparanoid  (N5 - unusual
pos tu r ing)  i tems loaded on the third and fourth  factors 
respectively. This analysis shows the Maine scale to have adequate 
construct validity.
Magaro, et al, (1981) also found the Maine Scale to have good 
concurrent  and discriminant  validity. The Maine Scale was 
signif icant ly  corre lated with subscales  from other diagnostic  
instruments used for dist inguishing paranoid from nonparanoid 
schizophrenia. For example, the Maine Scale was correlated with 
the appropriate subscales of the Symptom Rating Scale (Jenkins, 
Stauffacher, & Hestner, 1959), and the Symptom-Sign Inventory 
(Foulds, 1965 - cited in Magaro et al, 1981). This provided 
evidence of concurrent validity.
Evidence of discriminant validity was obtained by showing that the 
paranoid and nonparanoid subscales of the Maine Scale were not 
significantly correlated (r=.25, ns, n=48). The paranoid and 
nonparanoid subscales of the Symptom Rating Scale were, however, 
significantly correlated (r=.93, p<.001, n=47), as were those of the 
Symptom-Sign Inventory (r=.66, p<.001, n=47). This showed the 
Maine Scale to have a higher standard of discriminant validity than
two of the other scales commonly used to distinguish between 
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics (Magaro, et al, 1981).
The research in Magaro, et al, (1981) provides strong evidence for 
the validity and reliability of the Maine Scale of Paranoid and 
Nonparanoid Schizophrenia.
2.2.3.2 The Brief  Psychiatric Rating Scale
The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall & Gorham, 1962) is 
generally considered the most widely used scale for the objective 
rating of mental state (Manchanda, Saupe & Hirsch, 1986).
The BPRS (presented in Appendix D) was used in the present 
research as an indicator of symptom severity for the three clinical 
groups. Other research has also used the BPRS for this purpose (for 
example Geyer & Braff, 1982; Kline et al, 1992; Lukoff, et al, 1986; 
Muzekari & Bates, 1977).
The BPRS is an 18-item rating scale (Bell, Milstein, Beam-Goulet,  
Lysaker, & Cicchetti ,  1992). Ratings for each item are made 
following an interview with the participant. Seven items required 
an observation of part icipant behaviour during the interview
(Tension, Emotional withdrawal, Mannerisms and Posturing, Motor 
retardat ion, Excitement,  Blunted affect,  and Uncooperativeness) . 
The other 11 items are based on the content of the participant's 
verbal report (Somatic concern, Anxiety, Depression, Guilt, Hostility, 
S u s p i c i o u s n e s s ,  U n u s u a l  t h o u g h t  c o n te n t ,  G r a n d io s i t y ,  
Hallucinations, Disorientation, Conceptual disorganisation).
Each item is rated on a seven point scale ranging from 1 (symptom 
not present) to 7 (symptom extremely severe). Therefore the 
higher the BPRS total score, the greater the severity of current 
sy m ptom a to logy .
The BPRS has been found to have good reliability, validity and
clinical  utility (Bell, et al, 1992; Manchanda et al, 1986).
Manchanda et al (1986) reported an inter-rater  reliabil ity  of
r=0.88. Similarly, Bell et al (1992) reported an inter-rater 
reliability of r=0.87.
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Bell et al (1992) found the BPRS to have adequate convergent 
validity in a high correspondence (85.72%) between scores on the 
BPRS and the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale for a group of 
schizophrenics (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987). The BPRS also 
showed adequate predictive validity. Low scores on the BPRS were 
associated with low work performance measures and high BPRS 
scores were associated with high work performance measures (Bell 
et al, 1992).
2.2 .4  Procedure
Participants were interviewed for approximately 30 minutes to 
begin their involvement in the experiment. The interviews were 
based on the Maine Scale of Paranoid and Nonparanoid 
Schizophrenia (Magaro, et al, 1981), and the Brief Psychiatric Rating 
Scale (BPRS; Overall & Gorham, 1962). These scales are described in 
detail in sections 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2 respectively (pages 46 to 50). 
The information obtained from these scales is presented in section 
2.2.1. (pages 42 to 45).
Participants then completed the facial-affect recognition task as 
described in section 2.1.4.1.2 (page 38). Any further questions the 
participants had about the study were then answered. Finally, the 
participants were thanked for their help with the study.
Chapter Three
RESULTS
3.1 EXPERIMENT ONE
Exper iment  one was conducted with normal part ic ipants  to 
de termine  the relative item diff icult ies ,  on the facial-affect  
recognition task, for each of the six basic emotions.
The mean accuracies for the six emotions are presented in Table 4. 
The maximum score for each emotion was five, since there were 
five pictures presented for each emotion during the task. A score 
of five meant that the participant recognised all five pictures of 
that emotion accurately.
The total sample of 22 males and 36 females was included in the 
analysis. Results of evaluation of assumptions of normality, 
hom ogene i ty  of va r iance -covar iance  matr ices ,  l inear i ty ,  and 
multicollinearity were satisfactory.
It was hypothesised that happiness would be the easiest emotion to 
recognise, followed by surprise, disgust, sadness, anger, and fear, 
respectively (refer to page 31). From Table 4 it appeared that 
happiness, as expected, was recognised most accurately (mean = 
4.7, standard deviation = 0.61). Fear, as expected, was recognised 
least accurately (mean = 1.9, standard deviation = 1.23). The order 
of accuracy for the other emotions was not entirely as predicted. 
Disgust followed happiness as the next most accurately recognised 
emotion (mean = 3.8, standard deviation = 0.94), followed by 
surprise (mean = 3.7, standard deviation = 0.99), anger (mean = 3.3, 
standard deviation = 1.25), and sadness (mean = 3.1, standard 
deviation = 1.21).
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations; for Accuracv of Facial-Affect
Recognition as a Function of Emotion, and Sex of Particioant
Emotion
Group Happy Surpr ise Disgust Sad A n g er Fear
F e m a l e s
n =  36
M e a n 4.7 3.8 4 .0 3.2 3.1 1.9
St.  D e v 0.51 1.04 0.91 1.24 1.29 1.20
M a l e s
n =  2 2
M e a n 4.5 3.5 3.6 2.9 3.7 2.0
St .  D e v 0 .74 0.91 0 .99 1.17 1.08 1.31
T o t a l  S a m p l e
n =  58
M e a n 4.7 3.7 3.8 3.1 3.3 1.9
St .  D e v 0.61 0.99 0.94 1.21 1.25 1.23
A split-plot factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted
to compare differences in accuracy for sex of participant, and the 
six emotions. The sex of participant effect was not significant, F ( l ,  
56) = 0.26, p>0.05. This result showed, as expected, that males and 
females did not differ in their performance of the facial-affect 
recognition task used by the present research. The sex-by-emotion 
interaction effect was also not significant, F(5, 280) = 2.00, p > .0 5 .  
This was further evidence that the sexes did not differ in their 
recognition of facial-affect.
The main effect for emotion was significant, F_(5, 280) = 40.29, 
jl<.001. This showed that the emotions differed in recognition 
accuracy. The significant main effect  for emotion justif ied 
comparing the accuracies of the six emotions in more detail. Five 
planned, orthogonal contrasts, using unique sums of squares, were 
conducted to compare the recognition accuracy of the emotions.
The first contrast compared the accuracy of the positive with the 
negative emotions. As predicted, the average accuracy of the 
positive emotions (happiness and surprise; mean = 4.2, standard 
deviation = 0.97) was signif icantly higher than the average
accuracy of the negative emotions (disgust, sadness, anger, and fear; 
mean = 3.1, standard deviation = 1.36), 1(52) = 13.26 £< .001 .
The remaining four contrasts were planned using the expected 
order of accuracy of the emotions; happiness was expected to be the 
easiest emotion to recognise, followed by surprise, disgust, sadness, 
anger, and fear. The contrasts each compared the accuracy of two 
emotions. Unexpectedly, surprise (mean = 3.7, standard deviation = 
0.99) was recognised significantly less accurately than disgust
(mean = 3.8, standard deviation = 0.94), t(52) = 4.17, £ < . 0 0 1 .
Disgust was recognised significantly more accurately than sadness
(mean = 3.1, standard deviation = 1.21), 1(52) = 6.04, £ < . 0 0 1 .
Sadness was not recognised with significantly different accuracy 
from anger (mean = 3.3, standard deviation = 1.25), t(52) = 1.85, 
£>.05. Anger was recognised significantly more accurately than 
fear (mean = 1.9, standard deviation = 1.23), t(52) = 6.41, £< .001 .
3.2 EXPERIMENT TWO
3.2.1 Comparison of Sample Characteristics
Table 3 (page 43) presents a summary of the sample characteristics 
for the four groups. Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) 
were conducted  to compare  the four  g roups on sample 
characteristics. MANOVA was chosen as the test statistic since it 
reduces the likelihood of type I errors, compared to the error rate 
expected with multiple univariate tests (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).
A one-way MANOVA was conducted with Age and Education as 
dependent  variables,  and group (normal ,  depressed,  paranoid 
schizophrenic, and nonparanoid schizophrenic) as the independent 
variable. The Wilks' Lambda multivariate test for the analysis was 
not significant, F(6,126) = 1,88, £>.05. This indicated that there was 
no significant difference, in average age and education level, for the 
four groups.
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A second one-way MANOVA was conducted to compare the clinical 
samples (paranoid schizophrenic, nonparanoid schizophrenic, and 
depressed)  ( independent variable) on the durat ion of illness, 
number of hospitalisations, and BPRS score (dependent variables). 
The Wilks'  Lambda multivariate test for the analysis was not 
significant, F(6,90) 1.82, p>.05. This indicated that the three clinical 
groups did not differ  on dura t ion  of i llness,  number  of
hospitalisations, and BPRS score (an indicator of symptom severity).
3 .2 .2  Comparison of Group Performances on the
Facial-Affect Recognition Task.
Experiment  two was conducted to determine whether  normal, 
depressed, paranoid schizophrenic, and nonparanoid schizophrenic 
part icipants  differed in their performances on the facial-affect 
recognition task. Results of evaluation of assumptions of normality, 
hom ogene i ty  of va r iance-covar iance  matr ices ,  l inear i ty ,  and 
multicollinearity were satisfactory for the normal, depressed, and 
schizophrenic samples.
The samples' mean accuracies for the six emotions are presented in 
Table 5. The maximum score for each emotion was five, since there 
were five pictures for presented for each emotion during the task. 
A score of five meant that the participant recognised all five 
pictures of that emotion accurately.
As seen in Table 5, happiness was the most accurately recognised 
emotion for all groups. Fear was the least accurately recognised 
emotion for all groups, except the nonparanoid schizophrenics. The 
nonparanoid schizophrenic group's mean recognition accuracy for 
disgust (mean = 1.3, standard deviation = 1.38) was lower than 
their accuracy for fear (mean = 1.4, standard deviation = 1.22). 
However, the recognition accuracy for disgust and fear did not seem 
to differ in the nonparanoid group because the difference between 
their means was slight (difference = 0.1) in comparison to their 
standard deviations (both >1.0).
Table 5
Group Means and Standard Deviations for Accuracy of Facial-Affect
Recognition as a Function of Emotion.
Emotion
Group Happy Surpr ise  Disgust Sad A n g e r Fear
N o r m a l s
n = 2 0
M e a n 4.3 3.5 2.7 2.7 3.2 1.7
St .  D e v 0.81 1.17 1.32 1.16 1.12 1.37
D e p r e s s e d  
n =  16
M e a n 4.3 3.6 2.1 2.4 2.5 1.8
St .  D e v 0 .70 0.96 1.26 1.41 1.37 1.24
P a r a n o i d
n = 1 9
M e a n 4.1 2.5 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.7
St.  D e v 1.10 1.24 1.13 1.05 1.03 1.30
N o n p a r a n o i d
n = 1 4
M e a n 3.0 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.5 1.4
St .  D e v 1.78 1.15 1.38 1.38 1.29 1.22
T o t a l  S a m p l e  
n = 6 9
M e a n 4.0 3.0 2.0 2.1 2.6 1.7
St .  D e v 1.22 1.25 1.35 1.30 1.21 1.27
A split-plot factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
to compare differences in accuracy for group of participant, and the 
six emotions. The group of participant effect was significant, F (3 ,  
65) = 7.06, £<.001. This result showed, as expected, that the groups 
differed in their performance of the facial-affect recognition task.
The main effect for emotion was also significant, F(5, 325) = 37.94, 
£<.001. This showed that the emotions differed in their average 
recognition accuracy. The group-by-emotion interaction effect was 
not significant, F(15, 325) = 1.33, £>.05. This was evidence that the 
groups did not have different orders of recognition accuracy for the 
six emotions.
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3 . 2 . 2 . 1  Compari sons  between the Emot ions
The significant main effect for emotion justified comparing the 
accuracies of the six emotions in more detail. Five planned 
orthogonal contrasts, using unique sums of squares, were conducted 
to compare the recognition accuracy of the emotions. The first 
contrast compared the accuracy of the positive with the negative 
emotions. As predicted, the average accuracy of the positive
emotions (happiness and surprise; mean = 3.3, standard deviation = 
1.10) was significantly higher than the average accuracy of the 
negative emotions (disgust, sadness, anger, and fear; mean = 1.9,
standard deviation = 0.72), t(63) = 11.47, p< .001 .
The remaining four contrasts were planned using the expected 
order of accuracy of the emotions; happiness was expected to be the 
easiest emotion to recognise, followed by surprise, disgust, sadness, 
anger, and fear. The contrasts each compared the accuracy of two 
emotions. Surprise (mean = 3.0, standard deviation = 1.25) was
recognised significantly more accurately than disgust (mean = 2.0
standard deviation = 1.35), t(63) = 6.98, p<.001. Disgust was not 
recognised with significantly different accuracy than sadness (mean 
= 2.1, standard deviation = 1.30), t(63) = 1.06, p>.05. Sadness was 
not recognised with significantly different accuracy than anger
(mean = 2.6, standard deviation = 1.21), t(63) = 0.21, p>.05. Anger
was recognised significantly more accurately than fear (mean = 1.7, 
standard deviation = 1.27), t(63) = 5.05, p< .001 .
3 . 2 . 2 . 2  Compari sons  between the Groups
The significant main effect for group justified comparing the facial- 
affect recognition performances of the four groups in more detail. 
Three planned, orthogonal contrasts, using unique sums of squares, 
were conducted to compare the recognition accuracies of the 
groups. The first contrast found no difference in accuracy between 
the nonparanoid and paranoid schizophrenic groups, t(65) = 1.11,
p>.05.
The second contrast compared the average performances of the
schizophrenic groups (paranoid and nonparanoid), with the average 
performances of the control groups (normal and depressed). Figure
2 presents the average performances of the schizophrenic and 
control groups on the facial-affect recognition task. From Figure 2, 
the control groups appear to have performed more accurately, on 
average, than the schizophrenic groups. The difference between 
schizophrenic and control groups was significant, t(65) = 3.49, 
£ < . 001 .
The final contrast found no difference in accuracy between the 
depressed and normal control groups, t(65) = 1.03, £> .05 .
In summary, the only s ignif icant  d if ference  in facial-affect  
recognition among the four groups was that the control groups 
performed more accurately, on average, than the schizophrenic 
groups.
Figure 2 Mean Recognition Accuracies for the Control and 
Schizophrenic Groups on the Six Emotions.
Note: Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
Chapter Four
DISCUSSION
The present research investigated fac ia l-affect  recognit ion by 
individual's with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Previous research 
has suggested that schizophrenics have a deficit  for recognising 
facial-affect ,  particularly for negat ive emotions.  The present 
research aimed to determine whether the difficulties schizophrenics 
have with the recognition of negative emotions are part of a 
genera l ised  poor performance in sch izophren ia ,  or whether  
schizophrenics have a differential deficit  for the recognition of 
negative emotions.
The current results are discussed in sections 4.1 to 4.3. Section 4.1 
discusses the differential difficulties of recognising the six basic 
facially-displayed-affects.  Section 4.2 discusses the differences 
between the diagnostic groups, and the lack of difference between 
the sexes, in facial-affect recognition. Section 4.3 argues that the 
differences found between the clinical groups can be explained by 
differences in difficulty for the emotion tasks.
The remaining sections present implications of the present results 
for theory (section 4.4), and treatment (section 4.5). A summary of 
conclusions is then presented (section 4.6) followed by suggestions 
for further research (section 4.7).
4 .1  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EMOTIONS IN 
FACIAL-AFFECT RECOGNITION
Hypothesis One predicted that negative emotions would be more 
difficult to recognise than positive emotions. This hypothesis is 
supported by the current results. In experiments one and two, 
positive emotions (happiness and surprise) were recognised with 
greater accuracy, on average, than negative emotions (disgust,
sadness, anger, fear). This finding is consistent  with previous
research (Kline et al, 1993; Matsumoto, 1992; Mazurski & Bond,
1993; Morrison et al, 1988).
Hypothesis two predicted that happiness would be the least 
difficult emotion to recognise, whereas fear would be the most 
difficult to recognise. The expected order of accuracy for the 
emotions, from least to most difficult,  was happiness, surprise,
disgust,  sadness, anger, and fear. This hypothesis is partially 
supported by the current results.
As predicted, happiness was the least difficult emotion to recognise 
for participants in experiments one and two. This finding is 
consistent with previous research (Gross & Ballif 1991; Matsumoto, 
1992; Mazurski & Bond, 1993). As predicted, fear was the most 
difficult emotion to recognise for participants in experiments one 
and two. This finding is also consistent with previous research 
(Matsumoto, 1992; Mazurski & Bond, 1993).
The ease of recognition for the other emotions has not been clearly 
established in the literature. The current predictions were based 
on inter-rater agreements reported in Mazurski & Bond (1993) for 
the pictures of facial-affect  used in the present  research.  
Experiment one found that disgust was recognised more accurately 
than surprise by the undergraduate participants.  This is not 
consistent with the inter-rater agreements reported in Mazurski & 
Bond. However, their reported mean inter-rater agreements for 
surprise (81.8%) and disgust (80.3%) did not differ greatly.
In experiment two, with normal and clinical participants,  the 
predicted direction of results was found; surprise was recognised 
more accurately than disgust. This is consistent with the results of
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Mazurski & Bond (1993) for their slides of facial affect. Mazurski & 
Bond also reported inter-rater agreements for slides in the Ekman 
& Friesen (1976) series (cited in Mazurski & Bond, 1993). For the 
Ekman & Friesen pictures, the average inter-rater agreement for 
surprise (90.2%) was greater than the inter-rater agreement for 
disgust (87.2%) (Mazurski & Bond, 1993). The consistency between 
the results of experiment two, the reported inter-rater agreements 
for Mazurski & Bond's pictures, and the reported inter-rater 
agreements for Ekman & Friesen's pictures suggests that surprise is 
less difficult to recognise than disgust. It is unclear why the 
opposite direction of results was found in experiment one. Further 
research is needed to investigate this inconsistency.  Further 
research may determine whether the results of experiment  one 
simply represented random statist ical  f luctuat ion, or whether 
differences in sample characteristics between experiment one and 
two may have affected the results.
Disgust was expected to be recognised with greater accuracy than 
sadness. The results of experiment one supported this prediction. 
This is consistent with Mazurski & Bond (1993) who found disgust 
(inter-rater agreement = 80.3%) was recognised more accurately 
than sadness (inter-rater agreement = 79.1%). Mazurski & Bond 
reported similar inter-rater agreements for the slides of Ekman & 
Friesen (1976). For the Ekman & Friesen pictures, disgust had an 
inter-rater agreement of 87.2%, which was higher than the inter­
rater agreement for sadness (84.4%) (Mazurski & Bond,1993). In 
contrast ,  experiment  two found no d ifference in recognition 
accuracy for disgust and sadness.
A possible explanation for the inconsistency between the results of 
exper iments  one and two is that  exper im ent  one used a 
hom ogenous  group of par t ic ipan ts ,  undergradua te  univers i ty  
students, whereas experiment two used a heterogenous group of 
participants from normal and clinical populations. A homogenous 
group is expected to show less variation in their scores (evidenced 
by smaller  standard devia tions)  than a he te rogenous  group 
(Runyon & Haber, 1988). Differences between scores are more 
likely to be significant if standard deviations are small. Therefore, 
a homogenous group is more likely to show significant differences 
between scores than a heterogenous group. This could explain why
a difference between disgust and sadness was found in the 
homogenous sample in experiment one, but no difference between 
the emotions was found in the heterogenous sample for experiment 
two. The sample in experiment one was similar to the sample used 
by Mazurski  & Bond (1993) who also used undergraduate 
university students. This may explain the similarity in findings 
between Mazurski & Bond and experiment one.
Sadness was expected to be recognised with greater accuracy than 
Anger. The present results found no difference in accuracy for 
recognising sadness and anger. This is inconsistent with Mazurski 
& Bond (1993), who found sadness (inter-rater agreement = 79.1%) 
was recognised more accurately than anger (inter-rater agreement 
= 74.1%). However, this result is consistent with the inter-rater 
agreements reported by Mazurski & Bond for the Ekman & Friesen 
(1976) pictures. The inter-rater agreements reported by Mazurski 
& Bond for the Ekman & Friesen (1976) pictures, suggested that 
anger (inter-rater agreement = 85.0%) was not recognised more 
accurately than sadness (inter-rater agreement = 84.4%) (Mazurski 
& Bond,1993).
Anger was expected to be recognised with greater accuracy than 
fear. The results of experiments one and two supported this 
prediction. This is consistent with Mazurski & Bond (1993) who 
found anger (inter-rater agreement = 74.1%) was recognised more 
accurately than sadness (inter-rater agreement = 70.4%). The
current result is also consistent with the inter-rater agreements 
reported by Mazurski & Bond for the Ekman & Friesen (1976) 
p ic tures .
In summary, the current results suggest that positive emotions are 
less difficult to recognise than negative emotions. In the current 
results happiness was the most accurately recognised emotion, 
followed by surprise. Disgust  was the next most  accurately 
recognised emotion, followed by sadness and anger, which did not 
differ in accuracy. Fear was the most difficult emotion to recognise 
by facial-affect. These results are mostly as expected, and are
generally consistent with the previous literature.
4 . 2  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS IN FACIAL- 
AFFECT RECOGNITION
4.2.1 Sex Differences in Facial-Affect Recognition
Experiment  one found no sex differences in the recognition of 
facially-displayed-affect.  This result supported hypothesis three: 
that males and females would not differ on emotion recognition. 
The current result is consistent with previous research that found 
overall ability to judge facial-affect was not different between the 
sexes (Erwin et al, 1992). However, other research found sex 
differences in facial-affect recognition, with females more accurate 
than males (Gessler et al, 1989; Hall 1978).
The current results did not find an interaction between sex of 
participant and emotion depicted. This showed that males and 
females did not differ in their order of recognition accuracy for the 
six emotions. This provided further evidence that the sexes did not 
differ  in their recognition of facial-affect.  The lack of sex 
differences on the facial-affect recognition task used in the current 
research, suggests that the greater number of male than female 
part icipants  in experiment  two would not have affected the 
generalisability of the results to both sexes.
4.2.2 Differences between Normals, Depressives, 
and Schizophrenics in Facial-Affect 
R ecogn it ion
Hypothesis four predicted that nonparanoid schizophrenics would 
perform less accurately than paranoid schizophrenics on the facial- 
affect recognition task. This hypothesis was not supported by the 
current results. The current research did not find a difference in 
performance accuracy between the paranoid and nonparanoid 
groups. This result is inconsistent with previous research that 
found nonparanoid schizophrenics were less accurate than paranoid 
schizophrenics on facial-affect recognition (Kline et al, 1993; Lewis 
& Garver, 1995).
Apart  from differences in fac ia l -af fec t  recognit ion ,  previous 
r esea rch  has also found that  pa rano id  and nonparano id
schizophrenics differ on a number of other variables. Paranoid 
schizophrenics have a later onset of illness and a better premorbid 
adjustment (as measured by a higher level of social competency 
and a higher incidence of marriage) than nonparanoids (Burack & 
Zigler, 1989 - cited in Nicholson & Neufeld, 1993). Paranoid 
symptoms have reduced faster, and to a more significant degree 
fo l lowing diagnosis ,  than nonparanoid  sym ptoms (Goldberg,  
Schooler, & Mattsson, 1967). Furthermore, there is evidence that 
paranoid schizophrenics have a better prognosis than nonparanoid 
schizophrenics (Kendler, Gruenberg, & Tsuang, 1984; Nicholson & 
Neufeld, 1993). This evidence led Nicholson & Neufeld to suggest 
that paranoid schizophrenia is a less severe form of the illness than 
nonparanoid schizophrenia.
Kline et al (1993) and Lewis & Garver (1995) have been the only 
previous research to compare the facial-affect  recognition of 
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics. For this reason, the 
inconsis tency between the previous research and the current  
results could not be resolved by the current research. Further 
research is needed to determine whether  or not paranoid and 
nonparanoid schizophrenics differ in their recognition of facial- 
affect along with their apparent differences on variables such as 
age of onset, course of illness, and prognosis.
Hypothesis five predicted that the schizophrenic samples (paranoid 
and nonparanoid) would perform less accurately than the control 
samples (normal and depressed) on the facial-affect  recognition 
task. This hypothesis was supported by the current results. The
current results are consistent with previous literature that found 
schizophrenics performed more poorly on facial-affect recognition 
than normals and depressives (Gessler et al, 1989; Persad & Polivy, 
1993; Roland, et al, 1992; Rubinow & Post, 1992; Walker, et al, 
1984) .
Hypothesis six predicted that depressed participants would perform 
less accurately  than normal part ic ipants  on the fac ia l-affect  
recognition task. This hypothesis was not supported by the current 
results which found no difference in performance accuracy between 
depressed  and normal part icipants .  The curren t  resul t  is 
inconsistent with previous research that found depressives were
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less accurate than normals in facial-affect recognition (Feinberg et 
al, 1986; Gur et al, 1992; Mandal & Bhattacharya, 1985; Persad & 
Polivy, 1993; Rubinow & Post, 1992; Walker et al, 1984). However, 
the current results support research that reported no difference in 
facial-affect recognition between normals and depressives (Gessler 
et al, 1989; Gaebel & Wölwer, 1992; Smoller & Brosgole, 1993). 
Further research is necessary to resolve the inconsistencies in the 
literature regarding whether or not depressives have an emotion 
recognition deficit . This was not the purpose of the current
resea rch .
In summary, the only signif icant  d if ference  in facial-affect  
recognition among the four groups was that the control groups 
performed more accurately, on average, than the schizophrenic 
groups.
4 .3  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLINICAL AND
NONCLINICAL GROUPS IN FACIAL-AFFECT 
RECOGNITION EXPLAINED BY ITEM-DIFFICULTY
Hypothesis seven predicted that the differences in performance 
deficit  among the normal, depressed,  and schizophrenic groups
would be as expected from the relative item difficulties of the six
emotion-labell ing tasks. This meant that the groups were not 
expected to differ in their relative performances, across the six 
emotion categories. Each group was expected to agree on the
easiest emotion to recognise, and the most difficult to recognise. 
Furthermore,  each group was expected to have an equivalent  
progression of accuracy on the emotion labelling tasks. There was 
not expected to be an interaction effect between participant group 
and emotion task. If an interaction effect was evident, it was 
expected to reflect a ceiling and/or a floor effect. This would show 
the groups' performance converging for very easy, and/or very 
difficult, items.
Hypothesis seven was supported by the present research. The 
group-by-emotion interact ion effect  was not s ignif icant.  This 
provided evidence that the groups did not differ in their order of 
accuracy for recognition of the six emotions. The schizophrenic 
groups performed uniformly less accurately than the control groups
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across the six emotion labelling tasks. There was no difference in 
the deficits between the control and schizophrenic groups for 
positive and negative emotions. The current results aic consistent 
with Heimberg et al (1992) who found schizophrenics performed no 
differently on happy and sad discrimination tasks.
The current result,  that there was no specific deficit  for any 
emotion, is inconsistent,  however, with research that has suggested 
schizophrenics have particular difficulty recognising negative, as 
opposed to positive, emotions (Anstadt & Krause, 1989; Bellack, 
Mueser, Wade, Sayers, & Morrison, 1992; Kline et al, 1993; Mueser, 
et al, 1993). However, with the exception of Kline et al, none of 
this research used all six basic emotions. Furthermore, although 
Kline et al included the six basic emotions in their facial-affect- 
recognit ion-task ,  they grouped the six emotions into positive 
(happiness and surprise) and negative (disgust, sadness, anger, and 
fear) for their data analysis. Kline et al, did not investigate the six 
emotions individually. The current research investigated all six 
basic emotions individually, along with comparing the positive and 
negative groups of emotions. This suggests  that the current 
research has greater validity than previous research that did not 
separately analyse the six basic facially-displayed affects.
The current  result,  that  schizophrenics  performed universal ly 
poorly on the fac ia l-affect  recogni t ion  tasks,  suggests  that 
schizophrenics do not have a differential deficit for the recognition 
of negative emotions. Item difficulty (refer to section 1.2.4.5, page 
27) can explain the inconsistency between the current research and 
previous research that has argued for a differential deficit  in 
negative affect recognition in schizophrenia.
Section 1.2.4.5 presented an argument that differences in item 
difficulty, between positive and negative emotions, could explain 
the apparent differential deficit for negative emotion recognition 
that has been reported in previous research for schizophrenia. 
Because positive emotions are more easily recognised than negative 
emotions, it is argued that the lack of difference between a normal 
and a schizophrenic  group, for posit ive emotion recognition, 
represents a ceiling effect. The positive emotions are very easy to 
recognise  causing both normal and schizophrenic  groups to
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recognise them with similarly high accuracy. The negative 
emotions are argued to be more difficult to recognise, but not to the 
extent  where both groups would show very low recognition- 
accuracy (or a floor effect). The negative emotions are expected to 
have fallen in the medium levels of item difficulty, causing a 
difference, between the schizophrenic  and normal groups, for 
recognition accuracy (refer to section 1.2.4.5 for a more detailed 
explanat ion).  Hence, the finding of previous research that 
schizophrenics showed a larger deficit  from normal functioning in 
the recognition of negative than positive affect.
The current results did not find a differential deficit for positive or 
negative emotion recognition. This suggests that the current 
emotion-labelling task did not include extremely easy or extremely 
difficult items, which would have lead to a ceiling or a floor effect 
respec t ive ly .
The i tem-diff icul ty  explanation can account  for the current 
research, which did not find a differential deficit  for negative 
emotions, as well as for previous research that has supported a 
negative-emotion recognition deficit in schizophrenia. This suggests 
that schizophrenics do not have particular  difficulty recognising 
negat ive emotions. The current  research suggests  that the 
d if fe ren t ia l  defic i ts  between posi t ive  and negat ive  emotion 
recognition, reported in previous research, are merely an artefact of 
differential item difficulties for recognising positive and negative 
emotions .
The current  results support that, for facial-affect  recognition, 
schizophrenics are a lower functioning group than normals. The 
pattern of deficits between normals and schizophrenics on the six 
emot ion- labe l l ing  tasks shows that  sch izophren ics  performed 
uniformly less accurately than normals.  This suggests that 
differential  deficits for negat ive-emotion recognition found in 
previous research are an artefact of item difficulty effects (such as 
ceiling and floor effects).
4 .4  IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
The current research suggests that schizophrenics do not have a 
differential deficit  for negative, compared with positive, emotions. 
Item difficulty is capable of explaining the current results, as well 
as previous results, that have supported a differential deficit  for 
negative emotion recognition (refer to section 4.3, page 64). This 
suggests a redundancy in theories that have attempted to explain a 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  d e f ic i t  for  neg a t iv e  e m o t io n  r e c o g n i t io n  in 
sch izophren ia .
One  th e o re t i c a l  e x p la n a t io n  for  the  a p p a re n t  d i f f icu l ty  
schizophrenics  have recognising negat ive emotions is that the 
deficit is part of a defence mechanism. Bellack, et al, (1992; refer to 
section 1.2.4.3, page 26) argued that a defence mechanism 
(conscious or unconscious), protects the schizophrenic against the 
stress caused by the perception of negative emotions in others. 
Another theoretical explanation by Kline et al (1993) is that the 
d i f f icu l ty  recognis ing  negat ive  em ot ions  is not a general  
schizophrenic  deficit,  but is limited to the poorly organised 
emotional  schema of nonparanoid schizophrenics (refer to section 
1.2.4.4, page 26).
These theories can not explain the current research, which provides 
evidence supporting no differential deficits for the recognition of 
pa r t icu la r  emotions. Furthermore ,  the theories  explaining a 
d i f fe ren t ia l  defic i t  for negat ive  emotion  recogni t ion  appear 
redundant  after consideration of the argument that item difficulty 
can explain the schizophrenic differential  deficits,  for negative 
emotion recognition, found by previous research (section 4.3, page 
64) .
The possible  redundancy of the above theories suggests that 
theories  seeking to explain the schizophrenic  diff iculty with 
emotion recognition do not need to differentiate between positive 
and negative emotions. Imitation theory (Lipps 1907 - cited in 
Walbott,  1991) is one example of a theory that could explain the 
schizophrenic  difficulty with emotion recognition, but did not 
differentiate between positive and negative emotions. Imitation 
theory (Lipps 1907 - cited in Walbott,  1991) argues that people
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imitate the expression they perceive, then attribute feelings to that 
express ion from their prior self-perceptive experience.  These 
feelings, or emotions, are then attributed to the other person. It is 
possible that flattened affect in schizophrenia limits the imitation of 
other's facial expressions, and therefore causes a difficulty in facial- 
affect recognition (refer to section 1.2.4.2, page 25). This theory 
has little supporting evidence, however, and is hindered by 
knowledge that not all schizophrenics have the symptom of 
flattened affect.
The current  research also has implications of redundancy for 
theories that attempt to explain the schizophrenic deficit for facial- 
affect recognition per se. Previous research has suggested that 
schizophrenics do not have a differential deficit for facial-affect 
recognition, but that deficits in facial-affect recognition reflect a 
generalised poor performance for facial perception in schizophrenia 
(Feinberg, et al, 1986; Gessler, et al, 1989; Kerr & Neale, 1993). The 
research attempted to determine whether  schizophrenics have a 
differential deficit for affect recognition by comparing their relative 
performances on a facial affect recognition task, and a non-affect
control task matched for item difficulty. The inclusion of tasks 
matched on item difficulty meant that a differential deficit for 
facial-affect  recognition would represent a unique difficulty for 
schizophrenics that could not be explained as an artefact of item-
difficulty. However, this research found no differences between the 
facial affect recognition task, and the non-affect  control task, 
matched for item difficulty. This suggests that deficits reported by 
other research for emotion-recognition in schizophrenia represents
a generalised poor performance of schizophrenics, rather than a 
particular problem with affect-recognition.
Although the above studies controlled for item difficulty, they did 
not differentiate between the recognition of specific emotions. The 
research  did not, therefore ,  e l im ina te  the poss ib i l i ty  that 
schizophrenics may have a differential deficit for recognising some 
emotions but not others. If there are differential deficits between 
schizophrenics  and normals for the recognit ion of particular 
emotions, research that did not distinguish between the emotions 
would have been affected by this unexplained variability (refer to 
section 1.2.3.3, page 20).
The current research found no evidence for differential deficits 
between schizophrenics  and normals for the recognit ion of 
part icular  emotions.  This provides strong evidence that the 
difficulty of schizophrenics with facial-affect recognition represents 
a generalised poor performance in facial perception, rather than a 
specific deficit for emotion perception.
A possible explanation for generalised poor performance in facial 
recognition by schizophrenics is deficits in eye movement responses 
to visual stimuli, such as faces (Gordon, Coyle, Anderson, Healey, 
Cordaro, Latimer, & Meares, 1992). Eye movements and visual 
tracking influence attention for visual stimuli. To attend to visual 
information, an individual must be able to scan the stimuli for 
relevant details. Eye tracking dysfunction has been linked with 
schizophrenia in over eighty studies from around the world (Levy,
Holzman, Matthysse, & Mendell, 1993).
Schizophrenic individuals have shown deficits in eye movement 
response to a facial stimulus (Gordon, Coyle, Anderson, Healey, 
Cordaro, Latimer, & Meares, 1992). A face was presented for ten 
seconds, and eye movements were recorded. They found that eye 
movement of schizophrenics, compared with normals, showed a 
reduced fixation duration to facial features (eyes, nose, and mouth) 
in the early stages (first three seconds) of processing a face.
Another  f inding was that  sch izophren ic  ind iv idua ls  had a 
significantly smaller number of overall fixations on the face than 
normal controls. These findings suggest impaired attention to, and 
subsequent processing of, facial stimuli by schizophrenics.
Neuropsychology can also help to explain the deficits in facial
perception that  seem to be assoc ia ted  with schizophrenia .  
Neuropsychological research suggests that facial-affect recognition 
is a cognitive process distinct from generalised impairments in 
facial perception (Ross, 1981; Humphreys, et al, 1993; refer to 
section 1.2.4.1, page 23). This suggests that an individual could
experience deficits in facial-affect  recognition without general 
deficits in facial perception, and vice versa. The majority of 
research that controlled for the effects of item-difficulty has not 
found a differential deficit for facial-affect recognition, over general
face-perception,  in schizophrenia. This suggests that although 
affect and non-affect face perception have dist inct  cognitive 
processes, schizophrenia seems to be associated with deficits in 
both areas. Therefore, in schizophrenia, it seems that a more 
generalised attention and perceptual mechanism is responsible for 
problems in facial-affect recognition and face perception.
Further research based on a single-case-study design is necessary 
to determine whether any individuals with schizophrenia  have 
impaired facial-affect  perception without  concurrent impairments 
in general face perception. This would show a differential deficit 
for affect recognition, and would suggest that affect recognition 
deficits  in schizophrenia  were not necessarily  caused by a 
generalised perceptual deficit.
In summary, main implication for theory of the current research is 
that item difficulty can explain the apparent differential deficit for 
recognition of negative emotions in schizophrenia. Furthermore, 
the current research supports the explanation of previous research 
that the apparent differential deficit  for emotion-recognit ion in 
schizophrenia  can be explained by differential item-difficulties. 
The current research supports the explanat ion that generalised 
poor performance in schizophrenia for face perception is linked to 
the deficits in facial-affect recognition. These deficits of facial 
perception could be explained by schizophrenic deficits in attention 
and eye movement responses to visual stimuli.
4 .5  TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS
The previous section (4.4) argued that problems with facial-affect 
recognition do not represent a differential deficit for schizophrenia, 
but are better explained by deficits in facial, or visual, perception 
and attention. However, schizophrenics have consistently shown 
problems in facial-affect recognition (Feinberg, et al, 1986; Gessler, 
et al, 1989; Morrison, et al, 1988; Persad & Polivy, 1993; Roland, et 
al, 1992; Rubinow & Post, 1992; Walker, et al, 1984). Although 
deficits in facial-affect recognition may be caused by a more 
fundamental underlying deficit  in visual perception,  it remains 
likely that the facial-affect recognition deficit  may still cause 
unique problems for schizophrenics in social situations.
A deficit that causes problems for many schizophrenics in social 
situations should have implications for treatment. Understanding 
the origins of the problem helps to guide future treatment 
s tra tegies. The current  research suggests  that facial-affect  
recognition deficits are likely to be the effects of more general 
deficits in visual perception and attention. Therefore, treatment 
could be based purely on emotion recognition, or treatment may 
aim to target the underlying common deficit between emotion 
recognition and other deficits in social function.
Brenner, Hodel, Roder, & Corrigan (1992) presented a model of 
cognitive and social dysfunction in schizophrenia. They argued that 
elementary cognitive dysfunctions (such as of attention) lead to 
more complex  cognit ive  dysfunc t ions  (such as of concept  
formation). These cognitive dysfunctions are argued to cause 
dysfunctions in social skills. Brenner et al argued that treatment 
for  sch izophren ic s  must address  the under ly ing  cogni t ive
dysfunction along with the associated social dysfunction.
Hodel & Brenner (1994) reported evidence that improvements of 
the underlying cognitive functions alone did not appear to affect 
the subsequent social skills. It seems necessary to combine 
t reatment of cognitive functions with social skills training to 
achieve improvements in both areas. This suggests that treatment
for deficits in facial-affect  recogni tion requires two levels of 
intervention. The first level would address the underlying deficit 
in visual perception and attention. The second level would focus on 
facial-perception,  and more specifically, facial-affect  perception. 
The current research supports such a combined approach to the
treatment of the facial-affect recognition deficit in schizophrenia.
Morrison et al (1988) suggested that treatment specific to facial- 
affect perception could initially involve recognition-training with 
pictures of facial-affect (such as those used in the current research). 
They suggested the treatment could then progress to participation 
in role-played social interactions where emphasis  is on the
recogni t ion  of emotion-cues.  This  in tervent ion  focused on 
progressively improving facial-affect recognition in increasingly 
ecologically valid contexts.
Further research could determine the effectiveness of an affect- 
specific intervention, in combination with an intervention aimed at 
improving the attention and perceptual dysfunctions that appeared 
to underlie deficits in facial-affect recognition.
4 .6  CONCLUSIONS
The current results allowed the conclusion that positive emotions 
are less difficult to recognise than negative emotions. The current 
study found that happiness was the most accurately recognised 
emotion, followed by surprise. Disgust  was the next most 
accurately recognised emotion followed by sadness and anger, 
which did not differ in accuracy. Fear was the most difficult 
emotion to recognise by facial-affect.
The present research investigated the recognition of facial-affect by 
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The current results 
support that schizophrenics are a lower functioning group than 
depressives and normals for facial-affect recognition. The pattern 
of deficits between normals, depressives, and schizophrenics on the 
six emotion-labell ing tasks shows that schizophrenics performed 
uniformly less accurately than depressives and normals.
Previous research has suggested that schizophrenics have a deficit 
for recognising facial-affect, particularly for negative emotions. The 
present research concludes that schizophrenics do not have a 
differential  deficit  for the recognit ion of negat ive emotions. 
Furthermore, previous research that has suggested a differential 
deficit  can easily be explained by effects of item-difficulty (in 
particular, ceiling effects for positive-emotion recognition).
The main implication for theory of current research is that item 
diff icu l ty  can explain the apparen t  d i fferent ia l  defic i t  for 
recognition of negative emotions in schizophrenia. Furthermore, 
the current research supports the explanation that generalised poor 
performance for visual perception and attention in schizophrenia is 
underlying their deficits in facial-affect recognition. These deficits 
of facial perception could be explained by schizophrenic deficits in 
attention and eye movement responses to visual stimuli.
Together, these conclusions suggest that treatment for the facial- 
affect recognition deficit in schizophrenia should combine an affect- 
specific intervention with an intervention aimed at improving the 
a ttention and perceptual  dysfunctions that appear to underlie 
deficits in facial-affect recognition.
A possible flaw with the current research is that the clinical 
samples were medicated. It was not possible to access an 
unmedicated sample, nor to access details of the current samples' 
medication. However, this is not expected to have had a strong 
influence on the current results since Lewis & Garver (1995) found 
that  medica t ion did not affect  the fac ia l -af fec t  recognition 
performance of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics.
4 .7  IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
From the current results, and the previous literature, it is unclear 
whether or not surprise is generally less difficult to recognise than 
disgust. Further research is needed to investigate this.
Further  research is also needed to determine whether  or not 
paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics differ in their recognition 
of facial-affect. Kline et al (1993) and Lewis and Garver (1995) is 
the only previous research to investigate  differences between 
p a ran o id  and nonparano id  s c h izo p h re n ic s  on fac ia l - a f fe c t  
recognition. They found that paranoid schizophrenics performed 
more accurately than nonparanoids for the recognition of negative 
affect. The current research found no difference in facial affect 
recognition between paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics. The 
inconsistency between the studies in this area suggests the need for 
further investigation.
If  future research found that paranoid schizophrenics perform 
more accurately than nonparanoids for facial-affect recognition, the 
current study suggests this would be due to a generalised deficit in 
nonparanoids for visual perception and attention. Paranoids would 
also have deficits in this area, however nonparanoids would show a 
greater deficit. This would be consistent with the differences 
between paranoids and nonparanoids on other variables (such as
age of onset, course of illness, and prognosis) where paranoids 
appear to have less severe difficulties than nonparanoids.
Irrespective of whether paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics 
differ  in their facial-affect  recognit ion deficits ,  both groups 
displayed a need for treatment in this area. Future research could 
determine the effectiveness of an affect-specific intervention, in 
combination with an intervention aimed at improving the attention 
and perceptual dysfunctions that appear to underlie deficits in 
facial-affect recognition.
It is not conclusively established, however, that attention and 
perceptual dysfunctions are the basis of facial-affect recognition 
deficits in schizophrenia. Further research based on a single-case- 
study design is necessary to determine whether any individuals 
with schizophrenia have impaired facial-affect perception without 
concurrent impairments in general face perception. This would 
show a differential deficit for affect recognition, and would suggest 
that affect recognition deficits in schizophrenia are not necessarily 
caused by a generalised perceptual deficit. However, the available 
ev idence  sugges ts  that  more gen e ra l i sed  im pa i rm en ts  are 
responsible for the facial-affect recognition deficit in schizophrenia.
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Appendix A
THE SELECTION OF SLIDES USED FOR THE PRESENT
STUDY
(FROM THE SERIES OF SLIDES REPORTED BY 
MAZURSKI & BOND, 1993)
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1. Anger
The mean inter-rater agreement for the 20 anger slides (adult 
models)  reported by Mazurski & Bond was 72.05% (standard 
deviation = 9.928). The mean inter-rater agreement for the five
anger slides chosen for the present study was 72.4% (standard 
deviation = 3.78).
2. Disgust
The mean inter-rater agreement for the 20 disgust slides (adult 
models)  reported by Mazurski & Bond was 80.6% (standard 
deviation = 13.36). The mean inter-rater agreement for the five
disgust slides chosen for the present study was 81.2% (standard 
deviation = 4.15).
3. Fear
The mean inter-rater agreement for the 7 fear slides (adult models) 
reported by Mazurski & Bond was 64.6% (standard deviation =
8.58). The mean inter-rater agreement for the five fear slides 
chosen for the present study was 65.4% (standard deviation = 9.29).
4. Happy
The mean inter-rater agreement for the 20 happy slides (adult 
models) reported by Mazurski & Bond was 92.95% (standard 
deviation = 8.25). The mean inter-rater agreement for the five
happy slides chosen for the present study was 91.8% (standard
deviation = 2.95).
5. Sad
The mean inter-rater agreement for the 11 sad slides (adult 
models)  reported by Mazurski & Bond was 78.7% (standard
deviation = 11.07). The mean inter-rater agreement for the five
sad slides chosen for the present study was 78.8% (standard 
deviation = 5.07).
6. Surprise
The mean inter-rater agreement for the 20 surprise slides (adult 
models)  reported by Mazurski & Bond was 80.6% (standard
deviation = 15.16). The mean inter-rater agreement for the five
anger slides chosen for the present study was 82.6% (standard
deviation = 8.01).
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The 30 
Mazurski
slides used 
& Bond,
for the present 
1993):
study are presented below (from
Emotion Slide
Number
Model 
Number 
To Camera
Orientation 
of Face
Inter-Rater 
Agreement (%)
Anger 1015 MA2 Towards 72
Anger 26 MAI Towards 75
Anger 249 MA5 Towards 66
Anger 70 FA2 Away 74
Anger 89 FA3 Towards 75
Disgust 1025 MA2 Away 79
Disgust 237 MA4 Towards 88
Disgust 96 FA3 Away 81
Disgust 147 FA5 Towards 81
Disgust 19 FA1 Away 77
Fear 163 MA2 Towards 74
Fear 183 MA3 Towards 74
Fear 231 MA4 Towards 59
Fear 12 FA1 Towards 53
Fear 13 FA1 Away 67
Happy 175 MA3 Towards 91
Happy 245 MA5 Towards 93
Happy 154 MA2 Away 88
Happy 85 FA3 Towards 91
Happy 116 FA4 Away 96
Sad 1023 MA2 Towards 84
Sad 234 MA4 Away 78
Sad 33 MAI Away 73
Sad 16 FA1 Towards 84
Sad 94 FA3 Away 75
Surprise 255 MA5 Towards 89
Surprise 1009 MA3 Towards 70
Surprise 124 FA4 Towards 83
Surprise 15 FA1 Away 81
Surprise 77 FA2 Towards 90
Notes:
M = Male; F = Female; A = Adult
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Appendix B
DSM-IV DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR 
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE
DSM-IV Criteria For Major Depressive Episode 
(American Psychiatric Association. 1994)
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A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2- 
week period and represent a change from previous functioning: at least one of the 
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure.
Note: Do not include symptoms that are clearly due to a general medical 
condition, or mood-incongruent delusions or hallucinations.
(1) depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either 
subjective report (eg feels sad or empty) or observation made by others (eg 
appears tearful). Note: In children and adolescents, can by irritable mood.
(2) markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities 
most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account 
or observation made by others)
(3) significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (eg a change of 
more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day. Note: In children, consider the failure to make 
expected weight gains.
(4) insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day
(5) psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by 
others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed 
down)
(6) fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day
(7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being 
sick)
(8) diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every 
day (either subjective account or as observed by others)
(9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal 
ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for 
committing suicide
B . The symptoms do not meet criteria for a Mixed Episode
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (eg a 
drug or abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (eg hyperthyroidism).
E. The symptoms are not better accounted for by Bereavement, ie after the loss of a 
loved one, the symptoms persist for longer than 2 months or are characterised by 
marked functional impairment, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, suicidal 
ideation, psychotic symptoms, or psychomotor retardation.
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Appendix C
THE MAINE SCALE OF
PARANOID AND NONPARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIA 
(FROM MAGARO, ABRAMS, & CANTRELL, 1981)
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PARANOID SUBSCALE (From  M agaro , A bram s, & C an trell, 1981)
PI Does he (sic) tend to suspect or believe on slight evidence or without good reason 
that people and external forces are trying to or now do influence his behaviour, 
control his thinking?
1. No unjustified suspicions.
2. Will admit suspicion when pressed.
3. Easily admits suspicion.
4. Openly states others are trying to control him.
5. Has firm convictions that he is influenced or controlled.
P2 Does he tend to suspect or believe on slight evidence or without good reason that 
some people are against him (persecuting, conspiring, cheating, depriving, 
punishing) in various ways?
1. No unjustified suspicions.
2. When pressed expressed belief he is conspired against.
3. Frequently inclined to suspect.
4. Frank inclination to believe in persecution.
5. Strongly expresses conviction of persecution.
P3 Does he have an exaggeratedly high opinion of himself or an unjustified belief or 
conviction of having unusual ability, knowledge, power ,wealth or status?
1. No expressed high opinion of himself.
2. When pressed expresses a high opinion of himself.
3. Frequently expressed expresses high opinion of himself.
4. Open conviction of unusual power, wealth, etc.
5. Strongly expresses conviction of grandiose or fantastic power, wealth, etc.
P4 Does he tend to suspect or believe on slight evidence or without good reason that
some people talk about, refer to or watch him?
1. No unjustified suspicions.
2. Will admit suspicion.
3. Easily admits suspicion.
4. Openly states others that he is being watched.
5. Has firm convictions of being watched.
P5 Compared to others how openly hostile is he? Does he show hostility or a high 
degree of ill will, resentment, bittemess or hate?
1. No open hostility.
2. Relatively little hostility.
3. Some hostility.
4. Rather hostile.
5. Very hostile.
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NONPARANOID SUBSCALE (From Magaro, Abrams, & Cantrell, 1981)
N 1 Does he (sic) have perceptions (auditory, visual) without normal external stimulus 
correspondence?
1. None.
2. When pressed admits hallucinations.
3. Easily admits hallucinations.
4. Openly admits frequent hallucinations.
5. Openly hallucinates.
N2 On the basis of the integration of the verbal productions of the patient, does he 
exhibit thought processes which are confused, disconnected or disorganised?
1. As normal.
2. Slight disorganisation.
3. Mild disorganisation.
4. Marked disorganisation.
5. Complete disorganisation.
N3 How incongruous are his emotional responses? eg giggling or crying for no 
apparent reason or not showing any emotion when emotion would be 
appropriately shown.
1. As normal.
2. Slightly different from normal.
3. Responses somewhat incongruous.
4. Distinctly incongruous.
5. Very markedly incongruous.
N4 How well oriented is he as to time? For instance, does he know (a) the season; (b) 
the month; (c) the calendar year: (d) the day of the week; (e) how long he has been 
in hospital?
1. As normal.
2. Occasional confusion.
3. Slight confusion.
4. Frequent confusion.
5. Marked continuous confusion.
N5 Does he assume or maintain peculiar, unnatural, or bizarre postures?
1. None.
2. On rare occasions.
3. For short periods.
4. Frequently.
5. All the time.
Appendix D
THE BRIEF PSYCHIATRIC RATING SCALE (BPRS) 
(OVERALL & GORHAM, 1962)
(AS USED IN BELL, MILSTEIN, BEAM-GOULET, LYSAKER, &
CICCHETTI, 1992)
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
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Each symptom is rated on the following scale:
1 = Not Present, 2 = Very Mild, 3 = Mild, 4 = Moderate,
5 = Moderately Severe, 6=Severe, 7 = Extremely Severe
1. SOMATIC CONCERN - Degree of concern over present bodily health. Rate the 
degree to which physical health is perceived as a problem by the patient, whether 
complaints have realistic basis or not.
2. ANXIETY - worry, fear, or over-concern for present or future. Rate solely on 
the basis of verbal report of patient's own subjective experiences. Do not infer 
anxiety from physical signs or from neurotic defence mechanisms.
3 EMOTIONAL WITHDRAWAL - Deficiency in relating to the interviewer and the 
interview situation. Rate only degree to which the patient give the impression of 
failing to be in emotional contact with other people in the interview situation.
4. CONCEPTUAL DISORGANISATION - Degree to which the thought processes 
are confused, disconnected or disorganised. Rate on the basis of integration of 
the verbal products of the patient; Do not rate on the basis of the patient's 
subjective level of his own level of functioning.
5 GUILT FEELINGS - Over concern or remorse for past behaviour. Rate on the 
basis of the patient's subjective experiences of guilt as evidenced by verbal report 
with appropriate affect; Do not infer guilt feelings from depression, anxiety, or 
neurotic defences.
6 TENSION - Physical and motor manifestations of tension, "nervousness", and 
heightened activation level. Tension should be rated solely on the basis of 
physical signs and motor behaviour and not on the basis of subjective experiences 
of tension as reported by the patient.
7. MANNERISMS AND POSTURING - Unusual and unnatural motor behaviour, 
the type of motor behaviour which causes certain mental health patients to stand 
out in a crowd of normal people. Rate only abnormality of movements; Do not 
rate simple heightened motor activity here.
8. GRANDIOSITY - Exaggerated self-opinion conviction of unusual ability or 
powers. Rate only on the basis of patients statements about himself (sic) or self- 
in-relation-to -others, not on the basis of his demeanour in the interview situation.
9. DEPRESSIVE MOOD - despondency in mood, sadness. Rate only degree of 
despondency; Do not rate on the basis of inferences concerning depression based 
upon general retardation and somatic complaints.
9 3
10. HOSTILITY - Animosity, contempt, belligerence, disdain for other people 
outside the interview situation. Rate solely on the basis of the verbal report of 
feelings and actions of the patient toward others; Do not infer hostility from 
neurotic defences, anxiety, nor somatic complaints. (Rate attitude toward 
interviewer under "Uncooperativeness").
11. SUSPICIOUSNESS - Belief (delusional or otherwise) that others have now, or 
have had in the past, malicious or discriminatory intent toward the patient. On the 
basis of verbal report, rate only those suspicions which are currently held whether 
they concern past or present circumstances.
12. HALLUCINATORY BEHAVIOUR - Perceptions without normal perceptual 
stimulus correspondence. Rate only those experiences which are reported to have 
occurred within the last week and which are described as distinctly different from 
the though and imagery processes of normal people.
13. MOTOR RETARDATION - Reduction in energy level evidenced in slow 
movements and speech, reduced body tone, decreased number of movements. 
Rate on the basis of observed behaviour of the patient only; Do not rate on basis 
of patients subjective impression of own energy level.
14. UNCOOPERATIVENESS - Evidences of resistance, unfriendliness, resentment, 
and lack of readiness to cooperate with the interviewer. Rate only on the basis of 
the patients attitude and responses to the interviewer and the interview situation; 
Do not rate on basis of reported resentment or uncooperativeness outside the 
interview situation.
15. UNUSUAL THOUGHT CONTENT - Unusual, odd, or bizarre thought content. 
Rate here the degree of unusualness, not the degree of disorganisation of though 
processes.
16. BLUNTED AFFECT - Reduced emotional tone, apparent lack of normal feeling 
or involvement.
17. DISORIENTATION - Rate degree of confusion to person, place or time. For 
instance, does the patient know (a) the season; (b) the month; (c) the calendar 
year: (d) the day of the week; (e) how long he has been in hospital?
18. EXCITEMENT - Heightened emotional tone, increased reactivity, impulsivity. 
Rate on the basis of observations of the patient; Do not rate on the basis of the 
patients subjective verbal reports of excitement.
